The recent enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has changed Russian perceptions of risk in the High North, prompting shifts in Russia’s stated objectives in the region. In light of the changing security environment, RAND researchers analyzed potential escalation scenarios in the High North to better understand Russia’s priorities and activities in the region and how they might evolve after the Russia-Ukraine war ends.

Russia in the High North

Russian Strategy and Escalation Risks in the High North After the Russia-Ukraine War

Michelle Grisé, Yuliya Shokh, Stephanie Pezard, Alexandra T. Evans, Joe Haberman, Miriam Pasternak Joergensen, Mark Cozad

ResearchPublished Feb 17, 2026

In recent decades, the High North has played an increasingly important role in Russian strategic thinking. The region hosts an array of Russian military capabilities, including many of the country’s nuclear assets; provides a rich resource base for the Russian economy; and offers a gateway to strategically important sea lines of communication and transit routes that Russia expects will become increasingly contested because of the effects of climate change. Meanwhile, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—on April 4, 2023, and March 7, 2024, respectively—has more than doubled Russia’s land border with the NATO alliance. This has contributed to changes in Russian perceptions of the risk of escalation and military confrontation in the High North, prompting shifts in Russia’s stated strategic objectives and military posture in the region.

In light of these changes in the security environment, RAND researchers examined Russian perspectives of the High North and considered the risk of escalation in the region in the coming years. They identified a variety of escalation scenarios involving a conflict between Russia and the West in the High North and conducted virtual workshops with experts on Russian foreign policy and Arctic affairs to analyze these scenarios and identify factors that could escalate or mitigate the situation.

Key Findings

  • Russia’s overarching objectives in the High North include the defense of its national security and territorial integrity, maintenance of its status as a major power, and protection of the economic potential of the region.
  • The recent enlargement of NATO has heightened Russian threat perceptions in the High North. However, the Russia-Ukraine war has prevented Russia from fully realizing its military posture goals in the region. Russia’s decision to move conventional forces from the High North to Ukraine suggests that it views the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as a greater military priority than a potential conflict in the High North.
  • Russia might be disinclined to militarily escalate a crisis that is limited to the High North, absent evidence of a broader change in the regional balance of power.
  • Despite Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO, the High North remains a region of relative stability. There are still opportunities for limited cooperation between Russia and U.S. allies.
  • The economic potential of the High North could be harnessed to bolster Russian efforts to transition to a peacetime economy after the Russia-Ukraine war ends. The High North will serve as an important litmus test for assessing Russian priorities in the years after the war. The extent to which Russia makes new investments in the High North could signal whether Russia views the termination of hostilities in Ukraine as permanent.

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Grisé, Michelle, Yuliya Shokh, Stephanie Pezard, Alexandra T. Evans, Joe Haberman, Miriam Pasternak Joergensen, and Mark Cozad, Russia in the High North: Russian Strategy and Escalation Risks in the High North After the Russia-Ukraine War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3446-1.html.
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This research was sponsored by the Russia Strategic Initiative, U.S. European Command, and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division.

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