If ongoing geopolitical and regional trends persist, Australia may no longer be able to rely on the rules-based order. In such a scenario, maintaining the country's status as a stable middle power would arguably be the best short-term strategy. However, Australia's capacity to project global influence and shape the region will increasingly depend on its strategic importance rather than on rules, ideals, or values. Relying on emotional concerns about Australia's strategic dependence on the United States is unproductive, whilst clinging to outdated, static strategies or falling into the sunk-cost fallacy during regional and global upheavals will not adequately prepare Australia for the future.
How can Australia reinvent itself? One strategy is to adopt a distinct strategic position in the Indo-Pacific. Viewing Australia through the lens of cuspness offers an innovative perspective on its strategic challenges and a potential framework for adapting to the long-term disorder that may emerge.
What Is a Cusp State?
A cusp state refers to a nation that exists delicately on the border of established regions. These states are characterised not only by their geographic position but also by differences in culture, history, ethnicity, and beliefs that distinguish them from neighbouring areas. While they are not superpowers, cusp states often serve as important middle powers, featuring unique languages and economies. Importantly, cusp states are not all the same, even if they share similar geographic traits. Philip Robins, an expert on cusp states, suggests calling them “strategic countries”—nations whose actions significantly affect the complex, multilayered nature of international relations. Examples include Japan, Mexico, Israel, and Turkey.
These strategically important, often volatile states balance multiple influences and typically pursue pragmatic cooperation or adopt unique approaches to pursuing their national interests. Typically located between two or more regions, cusp states constantly decide whether to engage closely with specific areas or remain neutral. They often see themselves as “bridges” that connect diverse regions, which enables them to influence regional policies and outcomes while safeguarding their economic, diplomatic, defence, and security interests. They use strategies such as mediation, soft power, and multilateral diplomacy through existing institutions to reach their goals.
Cusp states are also volatile because they take riskier actions, such as the use of military force, to defend their national interests. This volatility arises from their position between rival power centres, where there is ongoing pressure to align with one side or another. They tend to balance among these rivals and manipulate relationships with great powers to gain concessions from multiple sides. This results in strategic hedging and frequent adjustments in foreign policy. Yet what appears as volatility—often involving the avoidance of alliance decisions that don't serve their interests—is primarily an exercise in strategic autonomy. They do not always seek consensus; rather, they often oscillate between agreement and resistance to new rules or changes when their interests are at risk. This flexibility is crucial and sets them apart from states without such a central and strategic position. This approach also affects how they engage with international institutions.
Turkey exemplifies the qualities of a cusp state. It showcases how a middle power can maintain strategic independence while functioning within alliance frameworks. As a NATO member for 74 years, Turkey occupies a strategic position between Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. Its status as a cusp state means it isn't fully aligned with any of the three regions. This enables Turkey to adopt flexible, multidirectional foreign and economic policies by oscillating between these areas and identities. It strives for strategic independence, balancing relations with Russia and the United States while operating autonomously. Concurrently, Turkey has expanded its influence across Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. It has mediated in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and played a role in reshaping Syria, for better or worse. Although Turkey aspires to join the EU, it still significantly influences debates and policies by opposing EU measures that affect its national interests.
Turkey's cusp identity and mercurical nature can be counterproductive, at times damaging its reputation and fostering mistrust among allies and partners. Unlike other cusp states, Turkey's institutional frameworks are weak, and its society lacks strong social cohesion; thus, it may struggle to reconcile internal tensions that are necessary to leverage its cusp status to its advantage without incurring domestic and geopolitical costs. Importantly, it has prioritised its national interests when necessary, at times disregarding its allies. Although this approach has been unpopular, it has sometimes been strategically correct. In hindsight, Turkey's strategically autonomous approach to the Syrian crisis demonstrates this kind of strategic thinking and an embrace of its cusp identity, which ultimately paid off for Turkey's political and security interests. Nonetheless, despite its volatility as a strategic actor, it remains within security alliance frameworks and is considered an important strategic partner, though it occasionally resists broader consensus. Despite these challenges, Turkey's cusp dynamics and its ability to navigate strategic autonomy within alliances offer valuable lessons for Australia.
Turkey's cusp dynamics and its ability to navigate strategic autonomy within alliances offer valuable lessons for Australia.
Australia: Adopting Cusp State Dynamics
In a highly competitive environment among great powers, adopting cusp dynamics could give Australia a strategic edge by enabling it to remain flexible and adaptive. This approach could help Australia manage its international relations carefully and hedge its bets when needed. It would recognise its liminal position among regions and primarily pursue its national interests in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and adjacent areas through transactional methods. Although it would join multilateral frameworks when necessary, it would avoid them if they conflict with its interests. Alliances would be evaluated through cost-benefit analysis, adopting a pragmatic, transactional view of the U.S.-Australia security partnership while also prioritising increased engagement with regional nations. Military activities would primarily focus within Australia's sphere of influence, and it would develop capabilities that support this strategy. This practical approach involves shaping and influencing regional and global developments to benefit Australia, potentially acting as a disruptive force that challenges emerging power structures and norms to safeguard its vital interests, rather than aligning with larger powers or prevailing trends.
Australia could enhance its role in Southeast Asia and the Pacific by acting as both a mediator and a regional participant, choosing when and with whom to engage, but not necessarily aligning with regional consensus. Already serving as a link between Western and Asian nations through its involvement in the Quad and ASEAN, Australia's embrace of cusp dynamics builds on these efforts. By accepting certain volatility in its relationships and recognising that its cuspness entails trade-offs, including sacrifices and compromises of values, Australia would be better able to manage its position in great-power competition. It could pursue pragmatic cooperation or, when necessary, forge its own strategic path in a rapidly changing region. Using cusp-state traits leverages Australia's geographic and strategic position and its identity tensions to benefit from the U.S.-China rivalry without full alignment. As in the earlier Turkish example, Australia's strategic significance would enable it to remain relevant within existing alliance frameworks, secure benefits, and preserve strategic independence as a middle power by adapting these cusp dynamics into its future strategy.
Adopting cusp state dynamics carries risks. Australia would need to dedicate substantial resources to defence and reduce its dependence on the U.S. and China to enhance strategic flexibility. Overusing this strategy could lead Asian neighbours to view Australia's balancing efforts as opportunistic or inconsistent, thereby risking mistrust among allies and partners. Managing numerous relationships could also dilute Australia's focus, and excessive economic diversification and hedging could invite economic coercion by larger powers. Additionally, this strategy may face opposition from politicians and public servants who support an alliance system that might become outdated as the global landscape changes over the next decade, and they may resist shifting Australia's identity away from its Western roots. All significant and important risks to consider. However, Australia possesses strong institutions, diplomatic sophistication, and, most importantly, domestic cohesion—qualities that, when effectively utilised, make it a formidable power in the Indo-Pacific and a more ideal candidate for strategically leveraging its cuspness.
Australia would need to dedicate substantial resources to defence and reduce its dependence on the U.S. and China to enhance strategic flexibility.
Australian Strategic Distinctiveness and the Emerging Order
The Indo-Pacific region faces increasing instability, necessitating that Australia adapt to changing circumstances. Practical diplomacy and strategic power play are essential. Despite some suggestions to revive a form of middle-power alliance outside of great-power competition and to promote “values-based realism”—a term that seems contradictory—if trends continue and the rules-based order is indeed in its death throes, then Australia might face a pivotal moment.
The challenge ahead for Australia is its absence of a tragic sensibility, which is necessary for accepting unavoidable trade-offs, value compromises, and potential losses in an uncertain future. Countries with strong strategic cultures understand this intrinsic realism. Incorporating cusp dynamics into its long-term strategy acknowledges internal tensions and regional shifts. Some may claim that this cusp-focused approach offers a narrow perspective on Australia's global role and is overly pragmatic and realist, suggesting that it is nothing more than hedging. But hedging assumes a highly reactive stance toward great-power politics and fails to account for proactive agency in shaping, acting on, and pursuing Australian interests in the near region and beyond. In the coming decades, Australia must recognise that it will need to leverage its resources and employ statecraft more effectively to sustain its strategic edge in a region poised to become the world's political and economic hub. Ignoring this is unrealistic and driven by optimism bias.
While policymakers often hesitate to embrace change, geopolitical shifts inevitably affect everyone. As author and physician Han Suyin observed, “We are all products of our time, vulnerable to history.” Strategic imagination can be limited only by an inability to think broadly and create the right conditions. If Australia wants to address its middle-power anxiety, it needs to shift from reactive management to strategic planning amid changing global and regional conditions, necessitating adjustments to its strategy.
By integrating cusp dynamics into its middle-power role, Australia can position itself as a knowledgeable and influential regional actor—ready to influence when necessary and to assertively oppose unwanted changes. Having some form of strategic autonomy is primarily about relative gains rather than absolute gains. Key to this approach is managing cusp flexibility without damaging credibility, which requires careful diplomacy and, if necessary, strategic revisions. Australia isn't lacking strategic imagination, but it lacks the permission to think beyond its last 80 years of success. It must adapt to the instability shaping the next decade or face failure, and it should prepare for potential setbacks. Embracing cuspness offers a way to look beyond the current strategic horizon and consider what comes next for a key country that should aim to be a force in regional geopolitics and economics in the coming century.
