When wars end, attention must turn to what comes next: the daunting work of rebuilding. In Gaza, that effort will be at the scale of European cities ruined during World War II or Iraqi and Syrian cities laid waste in the war against the Islamic State.
A precarious cease-fire and the 20-point peace framework have stirred hope, but this is also a moment for sober realism. The destruction in Gaza is staggering: Approximately 70 percent of all buildings are damaged or destroyed, 90 percent of residents have been displaced, and essential infrastructure is devastated. With entire neighborhoods flattened, hospitals and schools unusable, and utilities barely functioning, Gaza will need to be rebuilt almost from its foundations at an estimated cost of more than $70 billion.
Reconstruction, of course, cannot begin until political and security obstacles are addressed. Neither Israel nor Hamas has shown a genuine commitment to rebuilding Gaza or enabling the governance arrangements that such an effort would require. Yet even as these issues remain unresolved, it is time to think through the measures needed for recovery itself.
If the international community and regional actors approach Gaza's recovery without a common vision, realistic timelines, and insufficient planning, it will fail. But if planners, financiers, and governments can coordinate from the outset, then the physical reconstruction of Gaza will be a vital piece in creating the conditions for enduring stability. The way Gaza rebuilds in the next several years will determine whether this moment can break the region's long cycle of violence or become yet another false dawn.
The way Gaza rebuilds in the next several years will determine whether this moment can break the region's long cycle of violence or become yet another false dawn.
The war in Gaza has devastated Palestinian heritage—the physical landscape is so damaged that many Palestinians may no longer recognize their homeland. And while it is important to recognize what is lost and acknowledge that it cannot be fully recovered, moving forward may require seeing this moment as an opportunity to start anew and reimagine the territory's infrastructure altogether.
RAND, where I work, has developed a spatial vision for Gaza and the West Bank in collaboration with Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. planners that considers infrastructure and institutional needs across six sectors: transportation, energy, water, urban design, governance, and the environment. Our work shows that Gaza can be reconstructed not merely to restore what was lost, but to become a modern, sustainable region serving its residents, contributing to the regional economy, and perhaps even attracting future tourism. Gaza's cities could join other great economic powerhouse cities of the Middle East, such as Amman, Dubai, Muscat, and Tel Aviv. Such a vision could turn Gaza from a symbol of ruin into a model for regional renewal.
Yet even with a clear vision, reconstruction efforts—from post–Islamic State Iraq to the United States after Hurricane Katrina—take much longer than many leaders and donors expect. Plans that imagine Gaza fully restored in five years do not take this into account, although a short-term reconstruction sprint is important. Even prosperous, peaceful nations have found that recovery from major disasters often takes a decade or more. In unstable, conflict-prone contexts, it can stretch into generations. Germany after World War II is a case in point: Even 10 years later, West Germany was hailed as an economic miracle, while East Germany's reconstruction lingered unfinished. Without a careful approach, the timeline for Gaza's reconstruction could easily become measured in decades.
That should not be cause for despair, but for preparation. A pragmatic reconstruction plan addresses the unavoidable challenges before embarking: unclear property rights, rubble, immediate housing, restrictions on materials, management, and workforce shortages. Each of these has the potential to stop Gaza's recovery before it starts. But each can be mitigated with vision and planning.
A foundational issue in Gaza's reconstruction is property ownership. Every plot of land belongs to someone, yet ownership is often unclear (PDF). Even before the Israel-Hamas war, the property system was a patchwork of local, Israeli, Ottoman, British, and Egyptian laws mixed with informal claims and missing records, fueling persistent disputes. Creating a framework for ownership, compensation, and dispute resolution is essential before new communities can rise and existing communities can be restored.
Addressing rubble is the next challenge. Gaza faces an estimated 68 million tons of debris, far more than cities such as Mosul—with 7 to 8 million metric tons—after the war with the Islamic State. Buried within are human remains and an estimated 7,500 metric tons of unexploded Israeli munitions. The United Nations has estimated that clearing rubble alone could take 20 years. In Mosul, with 15 percent of the debris, cleanup remains incomplete after eight years.
It will be essential to prioritize which areas can be cleared and rebuilt first, cordon off dangerous areas, procure sufficient equipment, clear unexploded ordnance, secure staging sites where removed rubble can be processed, and carefully treat human remains. Efficiently clearing rubble will require international cooperation—and perhaps new technology, such as artificial intelligence–based hazard mapping—to accelerate progress. At the same time, Gaza's rubble could become an asset, if it is recycled into roads, ports, or even offshore islands as part of creative reconstruction projects. The sheer amount of material could help build the Gaza of tomorrow.
Another test will be housing all the displaced Palestinians while reconstruction is underway. With most housing damaged or destroyed, Gaza's residents are currently crowded in makeshift shelters on the beach, repurposed schools, and the ruins of their homes. As many as 1.5 million Palestinians may need interim shelter—with safe weatherproof structures, water, and electricity access—while permanent homes are rebuilt. The default in post-conflict zones is often to construct tent camps that are meant to last months but, in practice, become permanent cities. One-third of registered Palestinian refugees still lived in camps in the Middle East that were established after 1948 and 1967 when war broke out in October 2023.
A better approach would be to develop interim housing that is set up to avoid long-term encampment. Given the number of people involved, camps are inevitable, so our RAND report proposes creating purpose-built, “future-oriented” camps that can evolve into neighborhoods. These would have tent and caravan housing laid out on residential blocks, where permanent homes can be built later, with transportation and utility links to nearby cities. It also entails rehabbing partially habitable neighborhoods so families can live in place while reconstruction unfolds around them, incrementally. In other areas, destruction is total, and everything must be razed and rebuilt entirely, often through contracts with large international construction firms.
Materials themselves are another conundrum. For years, Gaza's economy was choked by tight dual-use restrictions limiting access to items that Israel deemed potentially usable for military purposes, including concrete, timber, and water filtration systems. The postwar reconstruction phase must include a serious rethinking of this policy, which devastated Gaza's construction industry but did not prevent Hamas from building its tunnel network. Refusing to allow basic building materials will only ensure Gaza's destitution—and with that, another round of violence in the future. Israel's legitimate security concerns can be met through monitored mechanisms and transparent supply chains. And taking some calculated risks on the materials needed to promote recovery may actually be the safest path forward.
Equally critical will be how reconstruction is financed and managed. Billions of dollars in donor funds and private investment may soon flow into Gaza. But money alone does not guarantee success, and Gaza cannot afford funding that arrives faster than management mechanisms can absorb it. Too often in the past, insufficient management has thwarted post-conflict recovery; a recent military review (PDF) pointed to many factors in the failure of the $145 billion U.S. investment in Afghanistan, including oversight structures that did not prevent rampant corruption. What ultimately matters is governance—essentially, management structures capable of prioritizing projects, blending local decisionmaking with international expertise, overseeing large capital projects, coordinating donors, and ensuring transparency of money flows. Gaza will need technical systems proven to work, including unified donor coordination platforms like the one the European Union developed for Ukraine.
Physical rebuilding is only one part of recovery; it must be accompanied by social and institutional rehabilitation.
Finally, Gaza's reconstruction will require a large skilled workforce, including engineers, construction workers, accountants, and planners. Gaza's labor capacity has been depleted by war; thousands of working-age men have been killed or disabled, and women's participation in the labor force remains low. Other recoveries show how dangerous it is to underestimate this problem. The U.S. Virgin Islands' reconstruction after hurricanes has been slowed for years by a shortage of skilled workers and lack of housing for those who could relocate to help. To prevent similar paralysis, Gaza will need vocational programs (PDF) to train Palestinians for rebuilding work. It will also need international labor imports, managed through large-scale contracts, with accommodations for foreign workers nearby, such as across the border in Egypt.
Physical rebuilding is only one part of recovery; it must be accompanied by social and institutional rehabilitation. Reconstruction won't progress without sustained security and political stability. Cease-fires can collapse; donor appetite can wane; regional tensions can flare. Nor should planners underestimate the human dimension: Widespread psychological trauma, physical disabilities from injuries, loss of social cohesion, and distrust among Palestinians after years of war are all serious barriers to recovery. Still, history shows that countries and cities ravaged by war, from Berlin to Ho Chi Minh City to Beirut, can rebuild—and even thrive—given time and the right approach.
The coming year will determine whether Gaza's recovery begins on realistic footing or remains in a quagmire. The difference will lie in the details, from workforce plans to institutional coordination. These may sound technical, but they are the foundations of peace and prosperity. Neglecting them will doom even the most generous international efforts. In contrast, getting them right could give Palestinians what they have lacked for decades: not just temporary relief, but a genuine chance to rebuild and remain in their homeland.
