Europe is finally taking its security seriously again, but it lacks a “theory of success” regarding the ultimate goal of its policy towards Russia and how the announced significant increase in defense spending will contribute to that goal.
At the NATO summit in The Hague, discussions will focus on increasing defense spending to 3.5 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) for defense and an additional 1.5 percent for security. This week, the Dutch Senate approved the Defense Initiative Act, committing the Netherlands to spend 2 percent of its GNP on defense. Europe as a whole has allocated €650 billion for defense investments, and fiscal deficit requirements have been adjusted to accommodate this.
There is criticism of this growth. Some parties are unwilling to commit to fixed spending targets. They argue that it is unclear whether Russia truly poses a threat. Skeptics dismiss the idea that Russia could or would want to overrun Europe, pointing out that Europe's GNP is much larger than Russia's and that NATO collectively spends far more on defense.
Russia's theory of success against NATO involves driving a wedge between allies, both within Europe and between Europe and the United States.
This criticism, however, addresses a straw man. Russia's theory of success against NATO involves driving a wedge between allies, both within Europe and between Europe and the United States. Russia effectively exploits Europe's understandable fears of nuclear weapons. It undermines infrastructure and threatens to use the same types of conventional missile and drone attacks it employs in Ukraine. The danger is not a large-scale invasion but, for example, a small number of Russian soldiers in Estonia that would force NATO member states into difficult decisions. If NATO becomes politically divided, Russia adjusts its ambitions accordingly.
The nervousness surrounding the NATO summit in The Hague is significant. In February, the U.S. Secretary of Defense made it clear that Europe is no longer the United States' top priority; instead, China and border security are. Europe must therefore ensure its own deterrence and defense capabilities. Without a strong American role in Europe, the balance of power against Russia becomes much less favorable for NATO. Many European states face issues such as outdated military infrastructure, ammunition shortages, and more. Europe's nuclear powers—France and the United Kingdom—do not have comparable escalation capabilities (and thus deterrence) to Russia. If the United States were distracted by a conflict in Asia, the Middle East, or domestic issues, Europe would be significantly weaker.
Moreover, Europe's or NATO's theory of success against Russia remains unclear. Throwing around percentages does not help. Without better justification in public discourse, rising defense spending risks being dismissed as merely appeasing the American president's criticism of unequal burden-sharing within the transatlantic alliance.
It is therefore crucial to structurally better understand Russian strategic culture and logic. Much is currently being done under the banner of deterrence, without clearly articulating what precisely frightens the Kremlin or what we aim to deter.
The Western approach has been reactive over the past decade and overly focused on avoiding escalation. However, we must dare to exploit Russia's fears about its own weaknesses. For instance, we know that Russia fears NATO's conventional air and precision weapons and that Russia's air and missile defenses have repeatedly failed in Ukraine. We also know that Russia fears attacks on its nuclear installations, missile defenses, and internal uprisings modeled after the so-called Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. These and other Russian fears should be leveraged. The ultimate goal should be for Russia to once again respect agreed-upon borders, including those of Ukraine, and refrain from undermining or intimidating European societies.
The ultimate goal should be for Russia to once again respect agreed-upon borders, including those of Ukraine, and refrain from undermining or intimidating European societies.
Knowledge of the adversary is essential to deter them and bring them to the negotiating table. During the Cold War, NATO's qualitative superiority in systems led to a willingness on the Soviet side to negotiate arms control. The announced deployment of intermediate-range missiles under NATO's dual-track decision in the 1970s and 1980s was a calculated risk intended to force the Soviets back to the negotiating table. At the same time, risk management is critical, as there are real dangers of signals being misinterpreted. And Putin's Russia operates differently than the Soviet Union. This underscores the need for both deeper and broader knowledge within Europe about Russia, where its vulnerabilities lie, and how Europe can best exploit them. Europe must be able to publicly justify why increased defense spending is valuable, if not essential.
After decades of decline, we must not only rebuild defense capabilities but also restore knowledge about Russia in universities, think tanks, and ministries. Especially with a declining role for the United States, Europe needs proactive solutions regarding Russia. If Russia interprets caution as weakness, peace in Ukraine and Europe will be even further out of reach.
