Using the CAS Directory
Indicators of defence participation
When assessing links to China’s defence sector, traditional due‑diligence methods often focus on who owns or oversees an organisation. However, this approach overlooks many civilian research institutes that, while officially overseen by civilian authorities, nevertheless play a role in building and maintaining China’s defence capabilities. For example, they might provide technical advice for developing military technology standards, carry out research funded by military entities, or supply goods, services or technology to China’s military-industrial complex.
To identify these types of connections, the CAS Directory takes a different approach. Rather than looking only at ownership or governance, it examines how each CAS institute participates in China’s broader defence ecosystem. Each CAS entity reviewed is assessed using six Defence Participation Indicators, which capture the different ways in which civilian organisations can contribute to the buildup and sustainment of China’s defence capabilities. These indicators are described in Table 1.
Table 1. Indicators of Defence Participation
| Indicator of Defence Participation | Definition |
|---|---|
| Defence advisory roles | Members of the entity’s leadership currently serve, or have previously served, as members of an expert committee (专家委员会), expert advisory committee (专家咨询委员会) or advisory committee (咨询委员会) focused on defence-related or dual-use matters. |
| Defence awards | Laboratories, researchers, or projects from the entity have received awards for work that furthers China’s military capabilities or other key national defence interests. Such awards are conferred by committees associated with core defence institutions, including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of National Defence (MOD), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Central Military Commission (CMC). |
| Defence funding* | The work of researchers from the entity has been, or is currently, funded by Chinese defence organisations. |
| Defence laboratories* | The entity houses laboratories part of China’s Defence Laboratory Research System. This includes Defence Science and Technology Key Laboratories (国防科技重点实验室), Defence Core Discipline Laboratories (国防重点学科实验室), and Ministry of Education (MOE) National Defence Key Laboratories (教育部国防重点实验室 or 教育部重点实验室（B类)). |
| Military-technology patents | Researchers from the entity have legal rights to a patent for an invention or innovation specifically intended for military or defence applications. A military-technology patent is defined as one assigned the Derwent Manual code W07, which corresponds to Electrical Military Equipment and Weapons. |
| Research collaboration with defence entities* | Researchers from the entity have co-authored publications with individuals from Chinese defence organisations. |
NOTE: Indicators followed by an asterisk are adapted from C4ADS. .2019. 'Open Arms: Evaluating Global Exposure to China’s Defense-Industrial Base'. As of 10 March 2026: https://c4ads.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/OpenArms-Report.pdf.
Chinese defence organisations comprise (1) the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or any organisation subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC), including the People’s Armed Police (PAP); (2) the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND); (3) academic institutions with extensive ties to China’s defence-industrial base, such as the Seven Sons of National Defence, the Seven Sons of Ordnance Industry, and the China Academy of Engineering Physics; and, (4) Chinese defence conglomerates, namely the Aero Engine Corporation of China, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, the China Electronics Corporation, the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, the China National Nuclear Corporation, the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, the China North Industries Group Corporation, the China South Industries Group Corporation and the China State Shipbuilding Corporation.
Degrees of defence participation
Isolated collaborations – for example, one defence‑funded project or a paper co‑authored with a military hospital – does not indicate that a CAS institute has deep or sustained ties to China’s defence sector. The CAS Directory therefore uses a graded scoring method rather than a simple yes/no approach. After gathering evidence, each institute is scored according to how often defence‑related activity occurs, when it happened, how much activity is involved, and how widely it extends across the institute. This approach provides a more balanced view of each organisation’s role in China’s defence science and technology ecosystem. The overall scale is explained in Table 2, while Table 3 shows how it is tailored for each specific indicator.
Table 2. Graded scale
| Score | Definition |
|---|---|
| 0 | Insufficient evidence — available data are too limited or of low quality to determine any level of defence participation. |
| 1 | No evidence of past or current participation in the development and sustainment of Chinese defence capabilities. |
| 2 | Limited defence participation — activity involves a few researchers or one‑off, historical collaboration with defence entities (typically before 2021). |
| 3 | Regular defence participation — activity involves multiple researchers or projects, over multiple years, and demonstrates continuing links to defence organisations (including after 2021). |
| 4 | Institutionalised defence participation — activity is frequent, current, large in volume, and spans multiple teams and areas within the institute. |
Typology of Actors
Because six separate scores can be difficult to interpret quickly, the Directory uses a typology of defence participation. This groups CAS research institutes according to their degree of embeddedness in China’s defence science and technology ecosystem.
The typology detailed in Table 4 shows patterns of participation, not ‘risk levels’. The level of concern depends on the nature of the proposed collaboration, institutional exposure and the safeguards users apply. Therefore, users should view the categories as a guide to help them prioritise resourcing for due diligence, not as a risk rating.
Table 4. Typology of actors
| Category | Description |
|---|---|
| Core defence partner | The institute is deeply involved in research and programmes that strengthen and sustain China’s defence capabilities. Senior figures may help steer national defence research priorities; many of its researchers and projects have recently been recognised for addressing defence needs; a significant body of current work is sponsored by defence organisations; it runs laboratories aligned with military objectives; has produced a large number of defence-related patents in recent years; and/or publishes extensively and regularly with defence institutions. Together, these patterns show that defence work is routine, large-scale and built into the institute’s operations and identity. |
| Regular defence partner | The institute frequently contributes to the development of China’s defence capabilities. Evidence indicates participation by multiple researchers in defence-related activities, with such activities occurring at consistent intervals and continuing in recent years. While engagement may be limited in scale or scope, its continuity suggests an established pattern of defence collaboration rather than isolated involvement. |
| Limited defence partner | The institute contributes to the development of China’s defence capabilities in ways that are limited in time, frequency, scope or scale. Evidence indicates that participation has either ceased or if it persists, it is narrow in scope, not institutionalised and occurs through isolated or infrequent activities led by individual researchers, rather than through sustained programmes or organisational commitments. |
| Civilian institute | The institute shows no public evidence of past or ongoing participation in the development or sustainment of China’s defence capabilities. Available data reveal no indications of defence-related projects, funding, collaborations or staff involvement. While this likely reflects a predominantly civilian focus, the classification is based on the absence of observable defence activity rather than verified confirmation of a strictly civilian research agenda. |
| Insufficient data | Publicly available information is too limited, inaccessible or incomplete to assess the institute’s participation in the development or sustainment of China’s defence capabilities. Available data cannot confirm whether the lack of evidence reflects genuine absence of defence-related activity or deliberate efforts to restrict or obscure relevant information. This classification therefore indicates an evidence gap — signalling that the institute’s level of defence engagement cannot be reliably verified at present. |
The six indicator scores are combined using a simple rule‑based framework explained in Table 5.
Table 5. Rules-based framework
| Rule | Resulting Category |
|---|---|
| Two or more indicators = 4 | Core defence partner |
|
One indicator = 4 and two indicators = 3 or Three or more indicators = 3 |
Regular defence partner |
| One indicator = 4 and one indicator = 3 and all other indicators = 1 or 2 or Two indicators = 3 and all other indicators = 1 or 2 |
Limited defence partner |
| All indicators between 0 and 2 | Civilian institute |
| Three or more indicators = 0 | Insufficient data |
NOTE: All indicators operate on a 0 to 4 scale. There is a total of six indicators.
Interpreting information and its limitations
Users should bear in mind the following caveats when interpreting information provided in the CAS Directory:
- The directory covers only first-degree research institutes – that is, core institutes directly administered by CAS – based in mainland China. As such, entity profiles do not include information on second-degree organisations, such as subsidiaries or commercial spinouts. Users should be aware that relevant activities or connections may exist at these secondary levels, which are not captured in the current profiles. The Hoover Institution, for example, found that ‘at least five companies spun directly off’ the Institute of Automation, namely Vistek, IrisKing, IriStar, Watrix and ViSystem, ‘provide surveillance products and services to China’s public security organs and other companies supporting public security operations’.4 Users are encouraged to conduct further due diligence on CAS spinouts.
- The first version of the directory covers 50 entities, selected for initial analysis based on their relevance to counter‑proliferation efforts. This necessary prioritisation may skew coverage toward entities with more visible defence participation. It does not imply that entities not included lack defence links or are less relevant to counter‑proliferation concerns. Additional entities will be added when further funding becomes available.
- All findings are drawn from publicly available sources and are intended to inform, not provide a definitive assessment. The directory should be considered one source of information among many when evaluating potential collaborations. Users should conduct their own due diligence and consult national authorities where relevant.
- Collaboration with a ‘core defence partner’ or ‘regular defence partner’ does not automatically make every engagement risky; risk depends on the partnership’s nature, safeguards and technology involved. Likewise, collaboration with a ‘civilian’ or ‘limited defence’ entity does not eliminate risk. Users are encouraged to assess each case individually.
The following caveats are particularly relevant to the metrics used:
- The metrics capture only highly visible forms of defence participation across six indicators. No signal means no activity identified under those six indicators – not necessarily an absence of defence involvement altogether. For instance, dual-use research, ambiguous defence-related statements or lack of visible defence patents or committee positions may fall outside these metrics.
- Other explicit indicators (e.g. supplying goods or services to China’s military-industrial complex) exist but were excluded because they rely on information available only within China, which would limit transparency.
- Additional secondary signs of intent (e.g. hosting, presenting at or attending defence conferences, or operating in military–civil fusion zones) also exist but are not covered in this initial release of the directory.
- The directory focuses on explicit defence links, not dual-use technologies (e.g. produced by ‘civilian institutes’) that could be redirected for military purposes (e.g. via military–civil fusion or the National Intelligence Law). No explicit defence link does not remove the risk of inadvertent technology transfer. Users should therefore conduct their own due diligence beyond what these six indicators show.
- The defence awards and defence advisory roles indicators use Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment (PHIA)-style language. However, the terms have been adapted to align with our own analytical framework and the types of sources we use.
Notes
- This includes general calls to serve or promote "national defence" and/or "national security" through the general activities of the laboratory, without reference to specific defence related activities. Return to content⤴
- This can include specific weapons projects or noted collaboration with military actors. Return to content⤴
- Chinese laboratories typically follow a hierarchical structure, with national laboratories at the top as the most prestigious, followed by national research centres, state key laboratories, provincial- and ministerial-level key laboratories, municipal-level key laboratories and, at the base, university and institute-level key laboratories. This hierarchy reflects differences in prestige, funding and research scope. Return to content⤴
- Stoff, Jeffrey and Glenn Tiffert. 2021. ‘Eyes Wide Open: Ethical Risks in Research Collaboration with China.’ A Hoover Institution Report. As of 20 March 2026: https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/stoff-tiffert_eyeswideopen_web_revised.pdf Return to content⤴