Ukrainians: Resilient and More Confident

Commentary

Nov 18, 2025

Ukrainian service members prepare an FPV-drone interceptor near Kupiansk, Ukraine, November 14, 2025

Ukrainian service members prepare an FPV-drone interceptor near Kupiansk, Ukraine, November 14, 2025

Photo by Sofiia Gatilova/Reuters

This commentary was originally published by The Hill on November 18, 2025.

Despite limits on some U.S. aid and a mushrooming corruption scandal, Ukrainians appear more confident. Europeans are stepping up support. Ukraine is leading in drone innovation and Russia is seizing only slivers of land and cannot land a decisive blow, even if the eastern city of Pokrovsk falls.

Although Western help is essential, Ukrainians now know they must carry the main burden.

Conversations with political leaders and analysts during a recent trip to Ukraine reveal a grit perhaps akin to that of Londoners during the Battle of Britain and the Nazis' Blitz bombing campaign of 1940 and 1941. Ukrainians face less intense bombing and may suffer a cold winter, but they have more outside aid. One leader explained that Russia lacked the military power to win and could not scare Ukraine into submission.

Ukrainians seem heartened by rising European support. One analyst described the election of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz as a turning point but voiced concern that domestic troubles might hinder British or French aid. Europe might be cautious, one leader said, because it doubted Ukraine could compel Moscow to withdraw, the way the Afghans forced the Soviets to do in the 1980s.

Ukrainians seem heartened by rising European support.

A leader praised Northern Europe as a bulwark of support. Northern Europeans feared that if the war in Ukraine ebbed, Moscow might surge forces into Estonia's ethnic Russian Narva enclave or into the Polish-Lithuanian Suwalki Gap, linking the mainland to Kaliningrad. NATO might not even realize the danger until it is too late.

Ukrainians view the United States as essential. A strategist said U.S. intelligence enabled distant strikes against Russian refineries and other war-supporting facilities. Patriot interceptors were the only defense, even if imperfect, against medium-range ballistic missiles.

Another analyst said Ukraine was keen on new, low-cost U.S. cruise missiles for its F-16s but even more eager for Tomahawk cruise missiles, which could destroy faraway defended targets.

Ukrainians might be looking at NATO in a more careful light. One leader I spoke to viewed Ukraine's defense ties with members as vital, but less so with the alliance itself. NATO was vulnerable to Hungarian vetoes and offered a disappointing response to Russian jet fighters overflying Estonia and drones penetrating Poland.

Ukrainians say NATO should view their country's potential membership as a mutually beneficial proposition for four reasons. First, Ukraine would bring Europe's largest combat-tested army to the alliance. Second, Ukraine was uniquely able to develop and produce drones on a large scale and at low cost and rapidly adapt them to a dynamic battlefield. Third, Ukraine could show NATO armies how it saved soldiers' lives by relying more on drones. And finally, Ukrainians believe the alliance can best defend itself from future Russian aggression if Poles and Ukrainians operate seamlessly along the eastern front.

With more Western financing, a military analyst said, Ukraine's nimble defense industry could produce most of its own arms while also helping Europe rearm. Drones, he said, might now be more important than nuclear weapons.

Ukraine, a former defense minister said, was on the forefront of a military revolution in “affordable mass precision.” Expensive arms would not be needed for Ukraine to erect an eastern barrier.

The Ukrainian public, a specialist observed, respect brigade-level commanders who were doing the fighting even if some think senior brass lead too much in a top-down, Soviet-style way. Competition to recruit soldiers was fostering reform, one analyst commented, but the people oppose conscription from the lean remaining cohort of young Ukrainians.

Several Ukrainians said they suspected Russia's economy and politics are somewhat fragile, and that its huge human combat losses might be weakening support for the war. According to my conversations, most Ukrainians favor a compromise if it ends the fighting.

Several observers noted concerns about the risks of a ceasefire. Moscow, for example, might break its word “as always.” Russia would use a lull to rearm. Ukraine may lack the will for peacetime conscription and the resources for a contract army. The West might think a ceasefire can allow it to move on.

Multiple observers emphasized that surrendering was not an option. One said massacres like the one Russian troops committed in Bucha had scarred Ukrainians. Another commented that just as some Arabs believed Israel ought not to exist, Russia opposes Ukraine's existence as an independent state.

In the event of a ceasefire, several leaders spoke of entry into NATO and a Western military presence in Ukraine as the best “security guarantees.” They did not expect U.S. soldiers in Ukraine, but they worried that Europe would send too few, base them far from the front or stifle their rules of engagement.

Overall, Ukrainians seem determined to keep fighting and unwilling to beg for a ceasefire.

One strategist said construction of more fortifications behind the front line and the fielding of a “drone wall” could reduce the need for foreign troops.

Overall, Ukrainians seem determined to keep fighting and unwilling to beg for a ceasefire. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, they appear to be of the view that if the West gives them “the tools”—especially financing and high-end military and intelligence support—they will ”finish the job.” But it will not be easy, and like the British, the Ukrainians cannot do it alone.

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William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Affairs. He was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the U.S.-USSR commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

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