Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has labeled his military's strikes on Russia's oil infrastructure “the most effective sanctions.” Meanwhile, reports indicate that alongside urging Europe and India to halt purchases of Russian oil, Washington plans to share additional intelligence with Ukraine on Russian refineries, pipelines, and other energy infrastructure.
Most discussions about these “sanctions” have focused on their financial implications for Russia. Vladimir Putin relies heavily on corruption and patronage, with oil and gas serving as key revenue streams. Disrupting the flow could force Putin to choose between sustaining the war and maintaining the payouts to oligarchs and citizens that secure his political backing—though such an economic squeeze would take some time.…
Still, oil shortages alone can grind the Russian bear to a halt militarily.
Russia is rich in natural resources and holds a significant manpower advantage over Ukraine, but it is also vast. To use either its resources or its manpower in the war, Moscow needs ready-to-use petroleum products.
To use either its resources or its manpower in the war, Moscow needs ready-to-use petroleum products.
After World War II, the United States commissioned a series of studies to evaluate the effectiveness of various war strategies employed by the Allies. One of the most comprehensive was the U.S. Strategic Bombing Surveys. These examined all phases of strategic bombing in the European and Pacific theaters. Though the report highlighted bombing failures, it also highlighted the value of strikes on oil, logistics, and power infrastructure.
Attacking oil infrastructure was decisive in both Europe and the Pacific. Blockades and strategic bombing of German oil refineries left the Wehrmacht with fuel shortages by 1945 and without key inputs to build munitions. Similarly, in the Pacific, interdiction by submarines and aerial mining of trade routes effectively depleted Japan's fuel reserves by the war's end. Further attacks on rail, road, and sea logistics prevented Germany and Japan from resupplying their forces and sustaining industry.
Bombing electricity generation, transmission, and fuel was a distant third in tangible effects on Germany and Japan's war efforts. A detailed reading of the bombing surveys indicates that attacks on oil and logistics alone were sufficient to end World War II.
One can see the parallels to Ukraine's strategy of striking Russian oil and logistics networks with drones and saboteurs. Beyond lines of cars and trucks waiting for fuel, broader effects are slowly manifesting in aggregate economic data and social media. Between 25 percent and 38 percent of Russian oil-refining capacity is offline, and that percentage is ticking upward. Attacks on Russia's rail networks are exacerbating this problem. Because of this, Russia will need to use more trucks, which are less efficient than trains, to move goods and resources, increasing fuel demand.
Crude oil and refined oil have interrelated but distinct roles. Crude exports provide revenue and foreign exchange to import war materials. Refined oil provides materials for industry and fuel for transportation. Pumping more crude won't remedy industrial production. Nor can it move trucks, tanks, drones, or aircraft.
Russia can absorb some reduction in refining capacity. It could import fuel and reduce what's available for personal vehicles. Still, Russia doesn't have a 25 percent to 38 percent buffer to insulate it from the steep reduction in refining capacity.
There already isn't enough fuel in Russia to meet all the industry and military needs.
That means there already isn't enough fuel to meet all the industry and military needs. By September's end, Russia had begun losing territory held in occupied Ukraine, and Russian troops cited supply shortages as a critical reason. Complaints on Russian social media about cutbacks to bus routes and bare store shelves, while unverified, are becoming more prevalent.
The consequences for Russia will grow, and Putin could be forced to choose: war-materials production or the commerce demands of Russia's oligarchs. Without reliable resupplies, the Russian military will become less mobile and create opportunities for incremental Ukrainian victories. The Russian bear is slowly being starved.
