This year marks the centenary of the United Kingdom's Fleet Air Arm (FAA), one of the five fighting arms and the naval aviation component of the Royal Navy (RN). The FAA is instrumental in supporting the United Kingdom's global power projection ambitions through carrier strike. However, evolving cost and capability pressures raise questions about the force's future direction. In the short term, limitations on the availability of F-35Bs to fulfill its carrier strike role are driving the RN to rethink the design of the carrier air wing concept. The RN is exploring options for a hybrid wing that combines crewed and uncrewed platforms to optimize capability, reduce costs, and maintain operational flexibility.
Yet, with growing pressure for defense to refine its operational focus and an anticipated increased NATO first tilt in the upcoming Strategic Defence Review (SDR), does the United Kingdom's retention of an independent carrier strike capability make sense in the medium term? For the FAA to reach its second centenary, it will need to demonstrate its relevance in innovative and transformative ways.
For the FAA to reach its second centenary, it will need to demonstrate its relevance in innovative and transformative ways.
A Proud History
The story of the FAA began after the World War I, when the RN first recognized the strategic potential of aircraft in naval operations. Although naval aviation had been explored as early as 1912, the FAA truly took shape in the 1920s and 1930s with its formal establishment as part of the Royal Navy's Air Branch. The United Kingdom fielded the world's first purpose-built carrier, HMS Hermes, in 1924, and the vital contributions of aircraft carriers and their air wings during World War II are well documented.
The post-war era saw continued advancements, including the introduction of the Sea Harrier in the 1970s, which enabled the FAA to operate from smaller carriers and amphibious assault ships, significantly enhancing the United Kingdom's expeditionary naval aviation capabilities. Despite challenges in the 1980s and 1990s, including aging aircraft and limited carrier availability, by 2018 the FAA fielded a capability of F-35Bs on newly commissioned aircraft carriers. Alongside a variety of helicopters, this provided essential anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and surveillance capabilities.
Aircraft Carriers & the Future Maritime Aviation Force
At the core of the FAA's operational capability are its aircraft carriers. Carriers remain invaluable tools for blue-water navies, establishing sea control and projecting power on the high seas. They provide the FAA with the foundation of its raison d'être, and the United Kingdom's commissioning of two modern carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, in 2017 and 2019 respectively, seemed to herald a clear future role for the FAA in the decades to come. However, a combination of repeated teething problems during the carriers' early operational lives and well-documented cost and availability challenges with the F-35B—the United Kingdom's chosen F-35 variant—has raised questions about the true potency of the United Kingdom's carrier strike capacity in real terms.
The lived reality of the F-35B and QE-class carrier capability mix also highlights another uncomfortable aspect of the FAA's future. It continues to rely on a mixed fleet of RAF- and RN-operated F-35Bs to field a viable carrier strike wing and depends on joint RAF capabilities, such as fast jet training and maritime patrol aircraft through the P-8 Poseidon, to assure maritime security from the air domain. For critics, this reliance may present a cost rationalization opportunity through force consolidation.
To its considerable credit, the RN has 'grasped the nettle' of the FAA's future viability and purpose through proactive efforts to redesign and reshape it via the Future Maritime Aviation Force.
The FAA is actively exploring uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) to enhance its operational capabilities, with various UAS tests planned for the Carrier Strike Group 2025 deployment to the Indo-Pacific. In 2023, the RN successfully conducted tests with UAS alongside fifth-generation fighters, including the launch and landing of a pilotless aircraft on HMS Prince of Wales and the Mojave unmanned aerial vehicle becoming the largest uncrewed aircraft to operate from an RN carrier. Through Project Ark Royal, the QEC carriers are being retrofitted to accommodate high-performance UAS as the FAA looks to expand its fleet of both advanced and smaller systems.
By integrating UAS capabilities into its carrier operations—including platforms like Vixen, Proteus, and Panther, as well as future initiatives such as a fixed-wing UAS to replace the Merlin-based Crowsnest—the RN aims to reduce costs, extend operational reach, enhance combat capabilities, and minimize risks to crew members. With over 40 UAS and 300 uncrewed systems currently in operation, the RN is poised to scale up its Fleet Air Arm, integrating autonomous systems for surveillance, strike missions, and resupply.
Taken together, these developments clearly demonstrate that the RN is actively considering the FAA's relevance as a future fighting force and will be preparing a strong case for the SDR to retain the United Kingdom's maritime strike capability. This argument is likely to emphasize its additive capacity for a NATO strike force and its importance to the United Kingdom's Indo-Pacific ambitions.
Looking Ahead
Future considerations for the carrier air wing are largely shaped by the limitations of the F-35 and the inevitable transition to uncrewed platforms.
Looking ahead, the hybrid carrier air wing concept could become a cornerstone of the FAA's strategy. Combining crewed aircraft with complementary UAS will reduce risks to personnel, expand operational reach, enhance capabilities, and provide increased combat mass and lethality. This approach will also offer the flexibility to meet a range of missions, from high-intensity combat to humanitarian relief.
While crewed aircraft will remain central to complex missions requiring human decisionmaking and oversight, UAS will complement these platforms by taking on tasks that are too risky, monotonous, or costly for crewed aircraft. Roles are likely to expand beyond electronic warfare, surveillance, aerial refueling, and related logistical tasks to include combat and strike roles. In addition to increasing combat mass and persistence, UAS will help the FAA manage operational costs and, in the long term, enable greater flexibility due to their ability to operate from a range of surface ships.
The FAA can reflect on a proud history but faces an uncertain future. Despite the public debate surrounding the challenges of the United Kingdom's carrier capability, the QE-class carriers are an unlikely target of the SDR. As a significant investment in UK industrial capability that is naturally maturing, their forward running costs are likely to be relatively modest, and their removal would signal a dramatic shift in UK strategic ambition.
The FAA's future will be shaped by its response to innovation.
The FAA's future will be shaped by its response to innovation, particularly through the smart integration of UAS, and its ability to demonstrate the additive capacity it provides to broader UK ambitions and NATO capabilities. This is especially pertinent as the United States, France, Italy, and Turkey field their own carrier strike capabilities in various forms. Fielding a differentiated carrier strike capability in the Indo-Pacific will also be crucial to advancing the United Kingdom's regional ambitions.
The FAA's ability to defend its raison d'être will likely hinge on its capacity to innovate and demonstrate its specialism in areas such as surveillance, electronic warfare, and logistics within the complex naval aviation operating domain. If executed effectively, the sky could indeed be the limit for the FAA in its second century, but the coming months will be crucial.
