Since taking office in October, Indonesia's former defense minister and new president, Prabowo Subianto, has made clear he plans to continue to promote his nation's traditionally non-aligned approach toward international affairs. In this vein, Prabowo last month visited China followed by the United States, meeting with both Xi Jinping and Joe Biden. Although Indonesia on paper seeks assiduous balance in its international relationships, the reality is quite different: Jakarta leans heavily toward China economically, and the United States militarily.
While in Beijing, Prabowo and Xi inked $10 billion in new economic agreements focused on a range of different areas, including infrastructure, green energy, renewable energy, and the digital economy. They further agreed to joint cooperation on fisheries, oil, and gas exploration in the Natuna Sea—a region squeezed between Indonesia's exclusive economic zone and China's “9-dash” line—prompting the Indonesian foreign ministry to clarify its position that the pact did not contradict Jakarta's longstanding position on the dispute.
One might argue Prabowo simply goofed on the joint exploration agreement in that he was unaware it could easily be viewed as undermining Indonesia's sovereignty claims in the Natuna Islands' surrounding waters. However, as a former defense minister, it is hard to believe this was the case. Rather, Prabowo likely took a calculated risk: open the door toward legitimizing China's illegal claims in exchange for important economic deals in the region.
Jakarta leans heavily toward China economically, and the United States militarily
His visit to Washington went more smoothly. Prabowo met Biden at the White House to commemorate 75 years of diplomatic relations and the furtherance of the U.S.-Indonesia comprehensive strategic partnership. The two leaders said their countries would work on “strengthening maritime security capabilities and to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, as well as fishing”—code for countering China's bad behavior in the South China Sea. Prabowo and Biden also hailed the defense cooperation agreement (DCA), signed last year, to uphold regional peace and stability.
Prabowo's visit to Washington also entailed engagements with Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the State Department and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at the Pentagon. During the Pentagon discussions, Prabowo and Austin specifically noted “shared security concerns in the South China Sea.” Prabowo further “affirmed his commitment to working closely with the United States to enhance interoperability, and to continue expanding bilateral and multilateral exercises, including Super Garuda Shield.” They also committed to a new initiative under the DCA that fosters people-to-people ties between alumni of both defense establishments.
A quirk of Prabowo's visit to the United States was that he failed to secure an in-person engagement with President-elect Donald Trump. However, the two men held a congratulatory phone call, which Prabowo's team video-recorded and subsequently posted online. It was clear from the call that relations between them will be close and cooperative, further reinforcing U.S.-Indonesia relations.
Prabowo's duel visits strongly suggest he is poised to accelerate economic cooperation with China and security engagement with the United States. Doing so is likely to strengthen Indonesian power by fueling its economic growth and development while modernizing and professionalizing its military forces. But a future crisis or war over South China Sea sovereignty and territorial disputes could leave Indonesia exceptionally vulnerable to Chinese economic coercion. Hence, Jakarta and Washington should seek to mitigate this challenge by forging new trade and investment deals.
Prabowo's duel visits strongly suggest he is poised to accelerate economic cooperation with China and security engagement with the United States.
The incoming Trump administration, however, may be loath to do this given the president-elect's concerns over economic imbalances, even among U.S. allies and partners. That said, the new administration is very likely to accelerate the implementation of its Indo-Pacific strategy of bolstering these same alliances and partnerships to counter China's rising challenge to regional peace and stability. If it prioritizes this point, then the second Trump administration could help Indonesia to reduce its overdependence on China. If the new Trump team views further economic engagement with Indonesia suspiciously, however, then this is likely to have the opposite effect.
A stronger Indonesia—the world's fourth most populous and largest Muslim majority nation, a fellow democracy, and archipelago spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans at the very heart of the Indo-Pacific—would be a good outcome for both Jakarta and Washington alike.
