Evolving Russian perceptions of the British and French nuclear deterrents
The study explored Russian perceptions of British and French nuclear deterrents.
Evolving Russian perceptions of the British and French nuclear deterrents
Photo by Tam McDonald/Crown Copyright
What is the issue?
Russian nuclear coercion has increased considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as Moscow continues to try to discourage the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from providing military support to Kyiv. To ensure that European countries can maintain a credible nuclear deterrence amid increasing tensions with Russia and heightened uncertainty in transatlantic relations, including the U.S.’s extended deterrent, it is essential to understand how Moscow perceives the British and French nuclear deterrents.
How did we help?
RAND Europe was commissioned by the Ministry of Defence through the Nuclear Deterrence Fund to conduct this study. The research team reviewed publications by Russian military experts between 2010 and 2024 to better understand how their perceptions of the British and French nuclear deterrents in the context of NATO (and relations with the U.S.) have evolved over time.
What did we find?
The study has found that while 15 years ago Russian military thinkers mostly focussed on the U.S.’s nuclear deterrent in the context of NATO’s deterrence posture, this is increasingly changing. Nevertheless, the Russian expert community continues to perceive NATO as a tool for U.S. foreign, defence and security policy. As such, the British and French nuclear deterrents were rarely discussed in the context of NATO’s nuclear deterrence between 2010 and 2024.
In terms of the credibility of the UK’s and France’s deterrents, our analysis suggests that while Russia perceives the UK’s deterrent as a credible threat able to impose unacceptable damage on Russia, it is considered relatively weaker than the French deterrent due to the UK’s perceived reliance on the U.S. both technically and politically.
At the same time, the French deterrent is perceived as politically and technologically highly independent. France’s political leadership has historically been considered friendlier to Russia, with a more national doctrine. Therefore, while French nuclear capabilities are considered highly credible, they have not been perceived as a direct threat to Russia. This may now be changing given more explicit statements since 2025 about extended deterrence against Russia.
Russian military discussions around NATO’s nuclear deterrence continue to emphasise the role of strategic conventional capabilities (such as long-range precision strike) in strategic deterrence. Therefore, it is essential that European capitals not only focus on their nuclear capabilities in the context of deterring Russia, but also consider the deterrent effect of their strategic conventional capabilities (or lack thereof), including long-range precision strike and missile defence systems, among others.
