Cost–benefit analysis for synthetic nucleic acid screening in the European Union
ResearchPublished Mar 10, 2026
This study, commissioned by Sentinel Bio, presents a European cost–benefit analysis of synthetic nucleic acid (DNA/RNA) synthesis screening. It compares voluntary guidance, funding conditionality and mandatory EU-wide regulation, assessing biosecurity risk reduction, research and innovation impacts, market fragmentation and regulatory design considerations, to support proportionate, evidence-based policymaking.
ResearchPublished Mar 10, 2026
Synthetic nucleic acids (custom DNA and RNA sequences) are routinely ordered from commercial providers and are essential inputs to vaccines, diagnostics, therapeutics, agriculture and industrial biotechnology. At the same time, the systems that enable rapid ordering and delivery of genetic material, may also allow access to sequences associated with hazardous biological functions. Screening, which involves checking both ordered sequences and customer legitimacy, has therefore been identified internationally as a key biosecurity safeguard.
However, across the European Economic Area (EEA), screening remains largely voluntary and unevenly implemented, raising concerns about regulatory arbitrage, market fragmentation and the distribution of security responsibilities between private actors and society.
Against this background of expanding technological capability, increasing accessibility and growing policy attention, RAND Europe developed a European-level cost–benefit assessment of alternative policy pathways for expanding synthetic nucleic acid synthesis screening. Rather than advocating a single regulatory outcome, it evaluates trade-offs between policy options and clarifies their expected societal implications. The analysis models three policy approaches over a ten-year horizon: voluntary guidance, conditionality linked to EU funding and procurement, and mandatory EU-wide regulation. It incorporates uncertainty surrounding rare, high-consequence biological incidents and accounts for compliance costs, research disruption, and expected reductions in accidental or deliberate misuse, including attempted evasion through non-EU providers.
The overall aim of the study was to provide a transparent, comparable basis for evaluating costs, implementation implications and societal impacts under different regulatory designs, thereby supporting evidence-informed and proportionate decision making.
All policy pathways generate positive societal benefits. Benefits rise disproportionately as screening coverage expands because higher coverage improves direct detection, increases deterrence of misuse attempts, and reduces the availability of non-compliant suppliers that enable evasion. Under conservative assumptions, these risk-reduction benefits exceed compliance and research-related costs.
Voluntary measures deliver modest gains (€193 million annually), conditionality linked to EU funding yields substantially larger benefits (€1.1 billion annually), and mandatory EU-wide screening provides the largest and most comprehensive impact (€4.6 billion annually), generating roughly €6 in avoided losses per €1 spent.
EU-level alignment protects responsible providers from competitive disadvantage, reduces market fragmentation and limits displacement of orders to weaker screening regimes within the EEA.
Cost estimates in the model are highly conservative and policy performance depends on clear requirements, phased rollout and alignment with existing screening practices to minimise administrative burden, particularly for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
Behavioural spillovers from internationally active suppliers may create additional risk reduction beyond the EU's jurisdiction, increasing estimated benefits by roughly 50% without proportionate increases in EU enforcement costs.
More comprehensive coverage strengthens biosecurity while maintaining an open research ecosystem, provided regulatory design minimises friction in legitimate research activity.
This research was independently initiated and conducted by the Center on AI, Security, and Technology within of RAND Global and Emerging Risks using income from operations and gifts and grants from philanthropic supporters. The Center aims to examine the opportunities and risks of rapid technological change, focusing on artificial intelligence, security, and biotechnology. A complete list of donors and funders is available at www.rand.org/CAST. RAND clients, donors, and grantors have no influence over research findings or recommendations.
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