FUSE

A unified framework for International Health Regulations, the Biological Weapons Convention, and UN Security Council Resolution 1540

Rohan Singh, Sana Zakaria

ResearchPublished Jan 9, 2026

Biological threats, whether naturally emerging, accidental or deliberate, produce early signals that are often indistinguishable from one another. Yet global reporting mechanisms for biological risk are fragmented across at least three major instruments: the International Health Regulations (IHR), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. Each regime was created for different purposes and collects related information through distinct reporting channels. This separation often obscures situational awareness in times of crisis, increases administrative burden, and can delay coordinated action during outbreaks.

This report analyses overlaps across the three systems by inductively coding 668 reporting items from the IHR State Party Annual Reporting tool, the Joint External Evaluation, BWC confidence-building measures, and UNSCR 1540 matrices. It consolidates these into a harmonised framework; the Framework for Unified Security against Epidemics (FUSE), comprised of 47 indicators across seven domains.

Findings show that while two-thirds of indicators appear in more than one regime, only a small subset represents true duplication. Core areas such as enabling legislation, biosafety oversight, and export/import controls draw on the same evidence base and offer opportunities for streamlining across reporting channels. Other areas reflect complementary purposes and should remain distinct.

The report recommends national coordination units for biological-risk reporting, lightweight interoperability between international secretariats, alignment around shared indicators, investment in reporting tools and capacity, and piloting integrated reporting models to assess administrative and operational gains.

Key Findings

Fragmented reporting obscures shared risk

  • Although IHR, BWC and UNSCR 1540 systems collect related information, they operate in silos, delaying cross-sector alignment when outbreaks occur.

There is shared conceptual terrain across regimes

  • Approximately two-thirds of harmonised indicators appear in multiple regimes, and a small subset reflect redundant reporting; primarily legislation, biosafety oversight and transfer controls.

Structural asymmetries produce preparedness blind spots

  • IHR tools capture surveillance and emergency response; BWC CBMs disclose biosafety systems; UNSCR 1540 matrices focus on legal and export-control measures. No single instrument provides end-to-end visibility.

Administrative burden reinforces inequity

  • Low-income states disproportionately bear the cost of redundant reporting, which diverts scarce expertise away from preparedness activities and can hinder access to financing.

Recommendations

  • Create national cabinet-level coordination units for biological risk reporting
  • Build light-touch secretariat-to-secretariat interoperability
  • Align donor incentives with integrated reporting
  • Invest in enabling tools and capacity
  • Generate operational evidence through pilots

Topics

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Citation

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Singh, Rohan and Sana Zakaria, FUSE: A unified framework for International Health Regulations, the Biological Weapons Convention, and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4559-1.html.
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