FUSE
A unified framework for International Health Regulations, the Biological Weapons Convention, and UN Security Council Resolution 1540
ResearchPublished Jan 9, 2026
This report analyses overlaps between IHR, BWC and UNSCR 1540 biological-risk reporting systems and develops a harmonised framework of 47 indicators. It identifies duplication, structural gaps and inequities, recommending national coordination units, cross-secretariat interoperability, donor alignment and pilots to improve global preparedness and streamline reporting.
A unified framework for International Health Regulations, the Biological Weapons Convention, and UN Security Council Resolution 1540
ResearchPublished Jan 9, 2026
Biological threats, whether naturally emerging, accidental or deliberate, produce early signals that are often indistinguishable from one another. Yet global reporting mechanisms for biological risk are fragmented across at least three major instruments: the International Health Regulations (IHR), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. Each regime was created for different purposes and collects related information through distinct reporting channels. This separation often obscures situational awareness in times of crisis, increases administrative burden, and can delay coordinated action during outbreaks.
This report analyses overlaps across the three systems by inductively coding 668 reporting items from the IHR State Party Annual Reporting tool, the Joint External Evaluation, BWC confidence-building measures, and UNSCR 1540 matrices. It consolidates these into a harmonised framework; the Framework for Unified Security against Epidemics (FUSE), comprised of 47 indicators across seven domains.
Findings show that while two-thirds of indicators appear in more than one regime, only a small subset represents true duplication. Core areas such as enabling legislation, biosafety oversight, and export/import controls draw on the same evidence base and offer opportunities for streamlining across reporting channels. Other areas reflect complementary purposes and should remain distinct.
The report recommends national coordination units for biological-risk reporting, lightweight interoperability between international secretariats, alignment around shared indicators, investment in reporting tools and capacity, and piloting integrated reporting models to assess administrative and operational gains.
This research was conducted in the Science and Emerging Technology Program within RAND Europe.
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