To ensure that European countries can maintain a credible nuclear deterrent amid increasing tensions with Russia, it is essential to understand how Moscow perceives the European deterrent. This report, therefore, reviewed publications by Russian military experts between 2010 and 2024 to better understand how their perceptions of the British and French nuclear deterrents in the context of NATO and relations with the U.S. have evolved over time.

Evolving Russian perceptions of the British and French nuclear deterrents

Zsofia Wolford, Elizabeth Moisan, Thomas Kenchington, Catherine Galley, Clara Le Gargasson

ResearchPublished Jul 22, 2025

Russian nuclear coercion has increased considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as Moscow continues to try to discourage the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from providing military support to Kyiv. To ensure that European countries can maintain a credible nuclear deterrence amid increasing tensions with Russia and heightened uncertainty in transatlantic relations, it is essential to understand how Moscow perceives the deterrents of European countries. As such, this report reviewed publications by Russian military experts between 2010 and 2024 to better understand how their perceptions of the British and French nuclear deterrents in the context of NATO (and relations with the U.S.) have evolved over time.

Key Findings

  • The study found that there is consensus within the Russian military-analytical community that the UK’s nuclear deterrent is highly dependent on the U.S., both technically and politically. Our analysis concluded that while Russia perceives the UK’s deterrent as a credible threat that is able to impose unacceptable damage to Russia, the credibility of British capabilities is considered relatively weaker than the French due to the UK’s greater reliance on the U.S.
  • The French deterrent is considered politically and technologically highly independent. France’s political leadership has historically been considered friendlier to Russia, with a more national doctrine. Therefore, while French nuclear capabilities are considered highly credible, it has not been perceived as a threat to Russia. This may now be changing given more explicit statements since 2025 on questions of extended deterrence against Russia.
  • The Russian expert community continues to perceive NATO as a tool for U.S. foreign, defence and security policy. As such, the British and French nuclear deterrents are rarely discussed in the context of NATO’s nuclear deterrence, which primarily focuses on the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
  • Russian military discussions around NATO’s nuclear deterrence also continue to emphasise the role of strategic conventional capabilities (such as long-range precision strike) in strategic deterrence. Therefore, it is essential that European capitals not only focus on their nuclear capabilities when considering the deterrence of Russia, but also consider the deterrent effect of their strategic conventional capabilities (or lack thereof), including long-range precision strike and missile defence systems, among others.

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Wolford, Zsofia, Elizabeth Moisan, Thomas Kenchington, Catherine Galley, and Clara Le Gargasson, Evolving Russian perceptions of the British and French nuclear deterrents. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3900-1.html.
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