Bankruptcy and Mass Torts After Harrington v. Purdue

Eric Helland, Lloyd Dixon, Jamie Morikawa, James M. Anderson, Bethany Saunders-Medina

ResearchPublished Jan 28, 2026

In recent years, bankruptcy has been used with increasing frequency as a strategy for resolving mass-tort litigation. Its appeal for defendants lies in the potential for global resolution—the ability to address all current and future claims in a single, centralized process. A key feature facilitating this capability has been the availability of nonconsensual third-party releases. These releases allow affiliated parties that have not declared bankruptcy themselves to be released from liability without requiring the unanimous approval of all mass-tort claimants and creditors. Often, these third parties contribute substantial sums to the bankruptcy estate in return for these releases.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. has had significant implications for the use of bankruptcy as a mass-tort resolution mechanism. Although the Purdue bankruptcy ultimately reached a successful settlement following the Harrington decision, the extent to which parties can still achieve—or approximate—a global resolution in bankruptcy remains uncertain under the new legal framework. Researchers analyzed Harrington’s potential impact; in this report, they present their findings.

Key Findings

Nonconsensual third-party releases have been heavily used in mass-tort bankruptcies for decades

  • Harrington introduces a significant change in this approach.
  • The new approach could strengthen mass-tort claimants’ bargaining positions.
  • It could increase the likelihood of lengthier negotiations, with potentially a lower chance of reaching global resolution.

Companies that continue to seek bankruptcy protection post-Harrington might be able to mitigate negative impacts

  • Third parties could offer additional compensation to holdouts to secure unanimous support of the settlement or higher payments to those who agree to release third parties.
  • A third party in a fully satisfied bankruptcy might argue that its liability is extinguished under the principle of preventing double recovery by plaintiffs.

Harrington has implications for the broader mass-tort landscape

  • Parties might be less inclined to use bankruptcy to resolve mass torts, possibly shifting focus back to the multidistrict litigation (MDL) process, with its attendant pros and cons.
  • Parties might continue to pursue bankruptcy without the expectation of extinguishing all claims, allowing most claims to be resolved while leaving third parties exposed to a much smaller number of claims in litigation.

Legislative and administrative responses could be used to mitigate Harrington’s effect on bankruptcy’s ability to achieve global resolution

  • Congressional modification of Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code could allow nonconsensual third-party releases in all mass torts, not just asbestos.
  • Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could standardize certain case management tools in MDLs by drawing on some procedural features that have supported resolution in mass claim contexts.

Recommendation

  • Although several trade-offs in the pursuit of global resolution are identified in this report, perform a more comprehensive analysis of these trade-offs to determine the optimal path forward.

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Helland, Eric, Lloyd Dixon, Jamie Morikawa, James M. Anderson, and Bethany Saunders-Medina, Bankruptcy and Mass Torts After Harrington v. Purdue. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3790-1.html.
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