The authors used a series of United Nations reports and content analysis to map the North Korean sanctions-evasion network. The authors then used advanced network analysis techniques to identify targets whose interdiction might best have disrupted the network. This report describes North Korea’s sanctions-evasion network and suggests potential ways of strengthening sanctions on North Korea and other future international sanctions regimes.

North Korea’s Black Knights and Dark Networks

Toward the Disruption and Typology of DPRK Sanctions Evasion Networks

King Mallory, Jesse Geneson, Alvin Moon, Nicolas M. Robles, James Syme, Weian Andrew Xie

ResearchPublished May 1, 2025

To judge the potential utility of network analytical techniques in improving the enforcement of sanctions, RAND researchers drew from 12 years of reports published by a panel of experts helping the United Nations (UN) enforce sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), among other resources. RAND used content analysis to map the North Korean sanctions-evasion network.

As a byproduct, the authors elaborated a typology of that network to describe it, then used advanced network analysis techniques to develop prioritized lists of targets whose interdiction might best have disrupted the network. Comparing the lists of best targets with the list of entities that have been sanctioned, the authors found that many entities that authorities may have needed to sanction effectively to disrupt North Korea’s networks appear not to have been.

This report describes North Korea’s sanctions-evasion network and suggests potential ways of strengthening sanctions on North Korea and other future international sanctions regimes.

Note: Researchers published code developed during this project to GitHub:

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Key Findings

International authorities do not appear to have sanctioned the DPRK enough

  • This appears to be particularly true of North Korea’s transportation and procurement networks (the latter includes procurement of petroleum products and luxury goods in addition to restricted or dual-use technologies), fewer than one-third of the optimal targets have been sanctioned.
  • The record was somewhat better for revenue-generating entities (authorities appear to have sanctioned close to two-fifths of the best targets); these numbers indicate that, to have the desired impact, authorities may have needed to sanction somewhere approaching 100 additional entities.

Sanctions-evasion activities took place in one form or another in close to 140 countries

  • The UN detected the greatest numbers of DPRK sanctions-evasion activities in Asia, Africa, and Europe, in that order. Between them, China and Russia accounted for just over one-half of the total activities detected between 2010 and 2022.
  • Four broad categories of entities were involved: organizations, individuals, aircraft, and vessels.
  • Five types of individuals were involved: overseas workers, foreign facilitators, overseas representatives, North Korean diplomats, and intelligence operatives.
  • These organizations and individuals were engaged in four basic types of sanctions-evasion activity: generating hard currency revenue; procuring petroleum products, restricted and dual-use technology, and luxury goods; finance; and transportation.

Recommendations

  • Work with authorities in key countries to enact legislation, if needed, to prosecute more foreign facilitators of DPRK sanctions evasion.
  • Work with countries having visa waiver agreements with the DPRK that ease the international movement of its overseas representatives to end those arrangements.
  • Dismantle the high-volume Malaysia Korea Partners (construction) and high-value-added Pan Systems Pyongyang (military electronics sales) networks.
  • Work actively to identify and repatriate North Korean overseas information technology workers.
  • Work with China, Taiwan, and Singapore to remove incentives for petrol smuggling.
  • Work with allied Asian countries more frequently to intercept, seize, impound, and publicly auction smugglers’ cargoes and vessels.
  • Where large procurement networks retain overseas branch offices in friendly countries, have those branches shut down.
  • Intervene diplomatically with host nations both to expel diplomats and technical staff acting as State Trading Company, procurement, or financial representatives and to reduce the relevant DPRK missions’ total allowable future headcount correspondingly.
  • Intervene with “secrecy jurisdictions” to shut down covert overseas financial transaction processing vehicles.
  • Close gold smuggling routes used to pay for proliferation activities.
  • Consider taking steps to exert pressure on China to adopt a stricter approach to countering sanctions evasion activity within its borders.

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Mallory, King, Jesse Geneson, Alvin Moon, Nicolas M. Robles, James Syme, and Weian Andrew Xie, North Korea’s Black Knights and Dark Networks: Toward the Disruption and Typology of DPRK Sanctions Evasion Networks. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3413-1.html.
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