The author of this report addresses the mismatch between the challenges that the U.S. Navy is likely to face in the international arena over the next decade and beyond and the Navy’s likely force structure. The author considers potential force structure shortfalls and suggests possible adjustments that can be made to how the Navy approaches force structure development.

United States Navy Force Structure

The Challenge of Global Crisis Response

Bradley Martin

ResearchPublished Jul 17, 2025

The author of this report addresses the mismatch between the challenges that the U.S. Navy is likely to face in the international arena over the next decade and beyond and the Navy’s likely force structure. Over several decades, the Navy’s force structure has gotten smaller, although the overall capabilities of its ships and submarines have improved and expanded. In this report, the author considers potential force structure shortfalls and suggests possible adjustments that can be made to how the Navy approaches force structure development. The author recommends that particular emphasis be placed on platforms that are capable of being deployed in sufficient numbers to provide persistent presence before crises develop.

The findings discussed in this report are based on research conducted from October 2023 to October 2024. Previously, the author spent several years researching the U.S. Navy and its interactions with potential adversaries, particularly the forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this report, the author applied this previous work to what is viewed as a significantly changed set of circumstances from those that drove the development of Navy force structure up to this point in history. This was an exploratory project intended as a roadmap for future study.

Key Findings

  • The U.S. Navy’s historical missions included presence and crisis response below the level of general war. These historical missions have provided options for decisionmakers throughout the Navy’s history.
  • The PRC invested in maritime military and paramilitary forces that allow it to coerce without resorting to high-end force.
  • The Navy’s force structure is purportedly optimized for a major conventional battle, but military exercise results have cast doubt on the actual relevance of much of its force for such a campaign.
  • Small surface combatants may have significant value in crisis response and presence. However, the industrial base is not well positioned to produce them.
  • The requirements process that the Navy employs is consensus-based and does not account for capabilities that lack significant community sponsorship.
  • The force has insufficient capacity to meet either worldwide presence or crisis response requirements.
  • The Navy is unable to meet the sustainment demands associated with a large and dispersed force structure.
  • Shipbuilding, ship maintenance, and ship manning are all heavily affected by shortages of skilled labor.
  • Unmanned systems can play an important role in a major theater war, but concepts of operations have not been developed to use them in crisis response or presence operations.
  • If the Navy decides that it needs small ships, it might be necessary to change the emphasis of builders' yards. This change would be at the expense of the larger ships that are being produced.
  • U.S. allies and partners have significant capabilities that may help with aspects of both presence and crisis response.

Recommendations

  • Existing presence requirements are unrealistic for the Navy force. The U.S. Navy should assess the value and priority of presence requirements. Until the Navy can adjust its force structure to better support presence, combatant commanders relying on presence will face risk trade-offs.
  • The Navy should seek guidance on and then develop one of the three force structure paths as a basis for requirements. These are different paths with different force structure implications that cannot all be employed at once. This cannot be a bottom-up statement of community requirements. Priorities will be set, force structure mixes decided, and readiness levels directed at the highest level and then executed.
  • The Navy should use the domestic industrial base to the extent that it can but should be prepared to use allies’ and partners’ ship-construction capability for small combatants. If the U.S. industrial base does not support fulfilling this requirement, there are options with partners and allies.
  • The Navy should develop concepts for using unmanned systems in crisis response roles. Existing concepts primarily emphasize major theater war employment. There may be other employment options, and these may require less-expensive and less-complicated unmanned systems.

Topics

Document Details

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

Martin, Bradley, United States Navy Force Structure: The Challenge of Global Crisis Response. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3294-1.html.
BibTeX RIS

Research conducted by

This research was conducted within the Navy and Marine Forces Program of the RAND National Security Research Division.

This publication is part of the RAND research report series. Research reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND research reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.