Acquiring Generative Artificial Intelligence to Improve U.S. Department of Defense Influence Activities
ResearchPublished Jul 22, 2025
The authors review current U.S. Department of Defense generative artificial intelligence acquisition efforts (focusing on influence activities) and provide recommendations for cost-effective acquisition and development.
ResearchPublished Jul 22, 2025
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) presents opportunities for scaling and automation of tasks and activities related to influence activities conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). DoD needs to rapidly acquire and employ generative AI capabilities to stay ahead of adversaries; however, ad hoc, bottom-up efforts to operationalize this technology create inefficiencies in acquisition and development related to common services and platforms, human capital and cross-functional teams, and contracting.
The authors of this report conducted a review of current DoD generative AI acquisition efforts (focusing on influence activities). They interviewed 18 subject-matter experts from DoD, the private sector, and government research organizations to identify force requirements and commercially available AI capabilities. They also held an expert workshop with 24 participants from various DoD influence organizations to elicit their generative AI–relevant operational and tactical needs. Drawing on this analysis, the authors provide recommendations for cost-effective acquisition and development to take advantage of current and emerging capabilities.
Generative AI acquisition has meaningful differences from traditional hardware and software acquisition, so the services should identify appropriate organizations to manage AI acquisition. The Principal Information Operations Advisor (PIOA) should direct the Office of Information Operations Policy (OIOP) to coordinate with influence-tasked units; U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM); service influence, information, and information operations organizations; and operational units with influence responsibilities to foster collaboration.
This research was sponsored by the Influence and Information Capabilities Subgroup of the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate (IWTSD) in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).
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