The Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War

Bryan Frederick, Alexandra T. Evans, Mark Hvizda, Alisa Laufer, Howard Wang, Samuel Charap, Krystyna Marcinek, Howard J. Shatz, Khrystyna Holynska, David A. Ochmanek, et al.

ResearchPublished May 22, 2025

Cover: The Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War

This volume presents findings from a series of RAND reports examining the Russia-Ukraine War’s geopolitical and military consequences and identifies cross-cutting implications for U.S. policymakers. In the series of reports and in the present volume, the authors employed a threefold approach. First, they surveyed historical wars of similar size, duration, and scope to bound expectations for the Russia-Ukraine War’s likely effects and aftermath. Second, they identified diplomatic, military, economic, and normative changes that have occurred as a result of the war using government documents and senior leader statements; discussions with subject-matter experts; and prior open-source research. Third, because the war is ongoing, they highlighted plausible future events or changes that could alter states’ responses to the conflict and, in turn, affect the report’s preliminary findings.

Key Findings

  • The war’s primary geostrategic effect has been to strengthen the relationship between the United States and its European allies while simultaneously weakening relationships between Europe and Russia and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the People’s Republic of China.
  • Russian and Chinese incentives to undermine the transatlantic alliance have increased.
  • U.S. and allied adaptations are necessary to prepare for future large-scale protracted conflicts and preserve extended deterrence.
  • The U.S. defense community may be neglecting the implications of the war in Ukraine for future contingencies beyond the Indo-Pacific region, including in Europe.

Recommendations

  • The U.S. government should increase collaboration, information disclosure, and planning with European allies for addressing U.S. global concerns; provide greater interagency attention to and resources for protecting U.S. and allied political systems from adversary information operations; and continue to refine U.S. and allied economic coercion tools.
  • The U.S. Department of Defense should focus defense industrial base investments on preparing for likely long-term needs, update U.S. and NATO plans for the deterrence of Russia to more fully incorporate lessons learned from the fighting in Ukraine, and assess the effects of increasing reliance on uncrewed aerial systems on adversary perceptions of U.S. commitment to the defense of NATO allies.
  • U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Space Force should examine opportunities to leverage actual and proposed European defense industrial base and infrastructure improvements to support U.S. distributed air operations and Collaborate with Ukrainian and allied air forces to incorporate insights from the war into national, bilateral, and NATO exercises and training.

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Frederick, Bryan, Alexandra T. Evans, Mark Hvizda, Alisa Laufer, Howard Wang, Samuel Charap, Krystyna Marcinek, Howard J. Shatz, Khrystyna Holynska, David A. Ochmanek, Omar Danaf, Brett Zakheim, and Kristen Gunness, The Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3141-1.html.
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