The authors evaluated the factors that drive regional and third-party responses to territorial revision attempts and found that they take into account a variety of factors, including fear of successive revision attempts, continued credible involvement from an outside power, legitimacy according to international and regional organizations, economic links between relevant parties, and the treatment of the population after a territorial takeover.

Responses to Territorial Revision

Historical Lessons

Andrew Stravers, Emily Higgs, Gregory Weider Fauerbach, Clare Porter

ResearchPublished May 14, 2025

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In this report, the authors evaluate the factors that drive regional and third-party responses to territorial revision attempts. They analyze five case studies that span peaceful cession, resistance with little international support, and resistance with significant international support. Each case study occupies a different place in this array, with the case of Hong Kong featuring a fully peaceful cession and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia seeing some very limited local resistance. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria saw full-scale local resistance with no international support. At first, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait met significant Kuwaiti resistance with no immediate international support, followed by a full-scale coalition response. Last, in the case of the Crimean War, the conflict was internationalized from the very beginning.

Using quantitative and qualitative methods, the authors found that third-party states take into account a variety of factors involved in the territorial revision when determining their alignment decisions in its aftermath. These factors include fears of successive revision attempts, continued credible involvement from another outside power, legitimacy according to international and regional organizations, economic links between relevant parties, and the treatment of the population after a territorial takeover.

Key Findings

  • Territorial revision is a rare event, and successful conquest is even rarer. Since World War II, there have been only 70 conquest attempts, of which 29 resulted in the conqueror holding the conquered territory ten years later.
  • Revision attempts tend to raise regional state threat perception. Spillover effects — in this case, the possibility of continued territorial seizure by the successful conqueror — drove behavior to guard against further attempts at territorial revision.
  • States consider a conqueror's adherence to international norms when deciding their response to a territorial revision. Third-party countries take a revisionist's failure to abide by these norms — especially in its treatment of conquered populations — as an indicator of the continuing threat a conqueror poses and its possibly broader territorial ambitions.
  • Strong international institutions facilitate reactions to revisionism. Institutions serve as fora to discuss and decide on collective policy responses to territorial revision attempts. They also provide potential conquerors incentives to follow the international order's norms, rules, and procedures.
  • Economic links play an important role both during and after revisionism attempts. States' economic considerations play a vital role in determining their alignment decisions. Third-party countries' attempts to both avoid economic pain and seek economic benefits were found in the case studies.

Recommendations

  • Revisionism attempts anywhere in the world would prompt a complicated set of calculations from regional actors. A key role for the Department of the Air Force is to provide continued involvement from U.S. forces by having necessary regional access and offering credible plans and strategies to protect regional states from further revisionism attempts.
  • Concurrently, there is a need to invest in a better understanding of partner and ally interests in response to a successful takeover attempt. This is to determine which activities allies and partners view as signaling the credibility of the United States' commitment to their security interests following territorial takeover. These activities include facilitating partner military modernization, arms acquisition, and tightened security partnerships with states whose threat perceptions are raised in the aftermath of a takeover.
  • Advanced and active engagement in international institutions can facilitate coalition-building in the event of a takeover attempt. Conversely, failure to adhere to established norms can weaken institutions. Efforts to enforce and frame norms can drive threat perceptions and resistance to revisionism and harsh treatment of acquired populations. Such activities as International Military Education and Training and hosting liaison officers can assist in instilling such norms across partnerships.

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Stravers, Andrew, Emily Higgs, Gregory Weider Fauerbach, and Clare Porter, Responses to Territorial Revision: Historical Lessons. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3140-2.html.
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