The role of space-based services in the war in Ukraine offers important lessons for how the United States must prepare for events in the space domain in potential future conflicts. RAND researchers recount space activities throughout the war and extract relevant lessons for the national security community. They use publicly available information to examine the mission areas that were most significant in shaping the war.

Lessons from the War in Ukraine for Space

Challenges and Opportunities for Future Conflicts

Andrew Radin, Khrystyna Holynska, Cheyenne Tretter, Thomas Van Bibber

ResearchPublished May 21, 2025

Cover: Lessons from the War in Ukraine for Space
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Space-based services and the disruption of these services have played an unprecedented role in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The role of space in the war offers important lessons for how the United States must prepare for events in the space domain in potential future conflicts. In this report, RAND researchers offer an open-source account of space activities throughout the war and extract relevant lessons for the national security community.

This report is organized along three mission areas that proved most significant in shaping the war in Ukraine: satellite communications (SATCOM); positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), including overhead imagery or radar. For each mission area, RAND researchers identified the prewar capabilities within Ukraine and Russia, specified how these capabilities were employed or disrupted in the war, and determined any associated challenges or issues for the key stakeholders in the conflict. They relied on publicly available information, including published statements by Western, Ukrainian, and Russian officials; literature from Russian and Ukrainian defense enterprises; and open-source reporting.

Key Findings

  • Key space services will likely be disrupted in future conflicts. Cyberattacks, Global Positioning System jamming, and other threats have significantly shaped the war, and the growing sophistication of both Russian and Chinese counterspace capabilities only increases the likelihood that the United States and its allies might face similar disruptions in a future conflict.
  • The widespread availability of space services increases the transparency of the battlefield. The accessibility of commercial imagery or released national imagery will likely make future large-scale conflicts relatively more visible in open sources and to wider audiences.
  • Commercial space services bring value and vulnerability. Ukraine’s ability to leverage Western commercial services enhanced its warfighting and reduced the need to field its own capabilities. Hesitations about SpaceX highlights how reliability concerns make countries cautious about depending on a single commercial provider.
  • Future warfare will present unique challenges and opportunities across different space mission areas. For SATCOM, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the potential utility of proliferated SATCOM architectures for enabling terrestrial forces. For PNT, the war in Ukraine has shown how space-provided global navigation satellite systems will very likely face continuing challenges from terrestrial jamming. For ISR, commercial ISR products or those shared by other partners can substitute for national capabilities, but an overdependence on shared capabilities can reduce U.S. partners’ freedom of action.

Recommendations

  • U.S. policymakers should plan to leverage commercial space assets to support allies and partners leading up to and during future conflicts.
  • U.S. policymakers should continue developing robust contract arrangements with commercial space providers and better articulate U.S. responses to potential interference.
  • The U.S. Department of Defense should continue investing in proliferated and diverse SATCOM architectures.
  • The U.S. Department of Defense should continue exploring innovative PNT technologies—including alternatives to the Global Positioning System—to ensure platforms and munitions remain effective against adversary electronic warfare interference.
  • U.S. policymakers should set expectations for its allies and partners about what kinds of ISR products—both commercial and government—will be available or shared in conflict.

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Radin, Andrew, Khrystyna Holynska, Cheyenne Tretter, and Thomas Van Bibber, Lessons from the War in Ukraine for Space: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Conflicts. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2950-1.html.
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This research was commissioned by U.S. Space Command and U.S. Space Force Space Operations Command. This research was jointly conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE and within the International Security and Defense Program of RAND National Security Research Division.

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