The authors held tabletop exercises with industry and government stakeholders to investigate where the supply chain for bromination systems might be vulnerable and identify solutions to potential disruptions. They also examine the broader implications for the defense industrial base and associated supply chains of other commodities that are similarly essential to the military and highly dependent on a single supplier.

Supply Chain Uncertainty and Responses

The Case of Ship Bromination Systems

Bradley Martin, Stephen M. Worman, Marzia Giambertoni, Phoebe Felicia Pham, Camille Reeves, David A. Shlapak, Brett Zakheim

ResearchPublished Dec 30, 2025

Bromination systems are used by the majority of U.S. Navy surface ships and many of the Navy's subsurface vessels for potable water purification. A supply chain disruption could therefore have operational impacts. However, production of brominator cartridges, a critical component of the systems, is entirely dependent on one manufacturer, which in turn relies entirely on one supplier of resin. Both companies are small and rely nearly exclusively on the Navy for their business.

The authors held a tabletop exercises with industry and government stakeholders to investigate where the supply chain for bromination systems, specifically brominator cartridges, might be vulnerable and identify solutions to potential disruptions.

At a second tabletop exercise, government stakeholders examined and discussed the broader implications for the defense industrial base and associated supply chains with respect to the kind of commodity bromination systems represent: commodities essential to the military but without significant civilian demand and highly dependent on a single supplier, whose business is in turn largely with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).

Key Findings

  • The actual use of bromine cartridges on U.S. Navy vessels appears to be steady, but the ordering of these cartridges has varied significantly.
  • The supply chain for brominator cartridges is entirely dependent on one manufacturer, which in turn relies on one supplier of resin. Both companies are small and rely nearly exclusively on the Navy for their business.
  • The fragility of the supply chain might not have received significant attention because the overall size of the program is very small relative to other items of interest for the Navy.
  • If the Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) ordered only to the level of actual need, the company could stay in business only by greatly increasing the price. The Navy and DLA have opted to buy in greater quantities than are actually required. In effect, the government is subsidizing a single company for which it does not have a ready alternative.
  • Solutions could include finding ways to support alternative suppliers, which would still face the overall issue of profitability in a niche market; public-private partnerships; or development of completely new technology to replace the legacy system.
  • The private sector might be ready to meet surge initially, but if anything were to interfere with production, including the availability of any number of small subcomponents, the opportunity to overcome the disruption might be very limited.
  • The application of a cost-risk-benefit framework, with recognition of the unique features of commodities whose main customer is the government, appears to be an effective approach.

Recommendations

  • DoD must generate an accurate projection of surge demand for any commodity it plans to use in likely contingencies, which could be defined as any scenario for which an operation or contingency plan exists or, for the longer term, for which a Defense Planning Scenario exists.
  • The Defense Contract Management Agency, DLA, and the services should strengthen risk monitoring of providers within key supply chains.
  • DLA and the services should formulate plans for surge capacity that recognize that industrial capacity in the United States will likely be insufficient for surge response.

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Martin, Bradley, Stephen M. Worman, Marzia Giambertoni, Phoebe Felicia Pham, Camille Reeves, David A. Shlapak, and Brett Zakheim, Supply Chain Uncertainty and Responses: The Case of Ship Bromination Systems. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2929-1.html.
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This research was sponsored by the Defense Logistics Agency and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).

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