In this report, the authors analyze how transitions in the basis of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) political legitimacy—from revolutionary charisma through economic prosperity to national populism—have affected the People’s Liberation Army's (PLA’s) development and performance. The authors also explore scenarios of how the CCP's legitimacy could evolve and what such changes could mean for the PLA and U.S. Department of Defense.

Political Legitimacy and the People's Liberation Army

Timothy R. Heath, Howard Wang, Cindy Zheng

ResearchPublished Jan 22, 2025

How does the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) political legitimacy affect the People's Liberation Army (PLA)? In this report, the authors explore how the nature of the CCP's political legitimacy profoundly shapes the military's development and performance. Through a case study analysis, the authors outline three types of political legitimacy in China: (1) "revolutionary charisma" under leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping from 1949 to 1979; (2) "economic prosperity" under leaders Deng, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao from 1979 to 2002; and (3) "national populism" under leaders Hu and Xi Jinping since 2002.

The authors find that each of these legitimacy types helped both drive and constrain the PLA's modernization and behavior in distinct ways. Moreover, each type of legitimacy experienced periods of strength and weakness. Through an alternative scenario analysis, the authors also explore how the CCP's evolution could change in coming years and what this could mean for the Chinese military’s development and for the U.S. Department of Defense.

Key Findings

  • The CCP has experienced long periods of transition between types of political legitimacy. Periods of stability for each type of political legitimacy have tended to last about ten years. According to this pattern, a transition to a new basis of political legitimacy is likely underway or imminent.
  • The strength of the CCP's revolutionary charisma legitimacy contributed to a dogged fighting style and impressive battlefield resilience in the Korean War. However, repeated policy failures discredited the CCP's revolutionary charisma–based legitimacy.
  • Although the turn to economic prosperity facilitated the military's embrace of modernization, it has proven a generally inferior substitute for the original Maoist formula in terms of the military's morale and willingness to take major risks and endure losses.
  • Under Xi, national populism as a type of legitimacy has incentivized the CCP to take more assertive actions to defend the nation's interests but paradoxically also increased its sensitivity to military casualties, which has resulted in a military that is improving its professionalism even as it remains cautious about combat operations.
  • How the CCP's legitimacy evolves in coming years will profoundly shape the form of military challenge posed by the PLA. The result could be a peer military competitor, but other scenarios are possible. For example, a weakened CCP and PLA could withhold cooperation on shared global security threats and exacerbate the burdens borne by the U.S. military and its allies and partners.

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Heath, Timothy R., Howard Wang, and Cindy Zheng, Political Legitimacy and the People's Liberation Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2751-1.html.
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This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Development Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division.

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