The authors describe how Russia’s armed presence in Africa has changed from mid-2023 to September 2024. The authors seek to identify where Russian mercenaries have a presence in Africa, what types of activities they perform, and the resulting implications of mercenaries’ use for African governments, economies, and civilian populations. The authors also analyze African publics’ sentiment regarding Russian mercenaries and Russia itself.

Russian Mercenary and Paramilitary Groups in Africa

Examining Changes and Impacts Since the Wagner Rebellion

Ryan Bauer, Alexandra Gerber, Erik E. Mueller, Cortney Weinbaum, Paul Cormarie, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo, Weilong Kong, Auburn Brown, Melissa Shostak, Zara Fatima Abdurahaman

ResearchPublished May 1, 2025

Cover: Russian Mercenary and Paramilitary Groups in Africa
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Since 2018, Russian private military contractors or mercenaries have proliferated across Africa. The largest mercenary outfit is the Wagner Group, which was led by Yevgeny Prigozhin until his death in 2023. Russian mercenaries serve as an important mechanism by which Moscow seeks to reduce its growing international economic and political isolation. Mercenaries help accomplish this by expanding Russia’s global footprint and influence at a relatively low cost.

Although Russia has sought to capitalize on its ambiguous relationships with mercenaries to ignore international norms, Moscow has taken public and direct control over these groups in countries in Africa. Russian mercenaries have operated a nimble expeditionary force, seemingly unencumbered by international rules of war, which has bolstered authoritarian regimes in Africa at the expense of the civilian populations’ and the countries’ overall security.

The authors describe how Russia’s armed presence in Africa has changed from mid-2023 to September 2024. The authors identify where Russian mercenaries have presences in Africa, what types of activities they perform, and the resulting implications of mercenaries’ use for African governments, economies, and civilian populations. The authors also examine how publics in countries where these mercenaries are present—and publics in neighboring countries—feel about and discuss Russian mercenaries and Russia itself.

Key Findings

  • Russian mercenaries have a clear presence in six African countries.
  • Despite the creation of the Africa Corps (an entity created after Wagner’s failed 2023 rebellion, intended to resume Wagner’s efforts in Africa), the Wagner Group’s structure and brand continue to be used in several countries to sustain existing operations. This structure can vary depending on the country.
  • Rather than addressing security issues and building defense capacity for countries in which they operate, Russian mercenaries seek to exploit and profit off insecurity.
  • The security situations in countries employing Russian mercenaries are worsening. The number of attacks and fatalities committed by militant Islamist groups has increased significantly since Russian mercenaries have replaced United Nations and West African security forces.
  • An analysis of public sentiment shows that those in several African countries hold more negative than positive views of Russian mercenaries.
  • Russian mercenary activities not only affect the countries that employ them, but they also affect surrounding countries. Both mercenary-perpetrated violence and illicit economic activity are not constrained by borders and have affected entire regions.

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Bauer, Ryan, Alexandra Gerber, Erik E. Mueller, Cortney Weinbaum, Paul Cormarie, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo, Weilong Kong, Auburn Brown, Melissa Shostak, and Zara Fatima Abdurahaman, Russian Mercenary and Paramilitary Groups in Africa: Examining Changes and Impacts Since the Wagner Rebellion. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2613-1.html.
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