In this report—part of a larger study of prospective nuclear escalation risks in a U.S.-China military conflict—the authors draw on historical experience and analytic strategic theory to explore how U.S. joint long-range strike could adapt to better balance military operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management to achieve desired objectives while avoiding catastrophic escalation, specifically Chinese nuclear first use.

Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold

Vol. 4, Imagining Escalation Pathways to Chinese Nuclear First Use Via Analytic Strategic Theory, Historical Case Studies, and an Original Analytic Framework

Edward Geist, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Nina Miller, Shawn Cochran, Jeff Hagen, David R. Frelinger, Cindy Zheng, William Kim, Elliot Ji, et al.

ResearchPublished Nov 15, 2024

Rising tensions between Washington and Beijing, coupled with China’s ongoing expansion of its nuclear arsenal, have stoked anxieties about a possible military conflict between the two countries, especially over Taiwan. As the United States considers the prospect of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. military must be prepared for the risks of nuclear escalation inherent in great-power conflict.

This report is one in a series of reports exploring how U.S. joint long-range strike, especially the U.S. Air Force's bomber force, could adapt to better balance military operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management to achieve desired military and political objectives without triggering catastrophic escalation, specifically Chinese nuclear first use. This report explores potential escalation pathways that involve U.S. conventional long-range strike and end with Chinese nuclear first use.

The authors employ analytic strategic theory and historical case studies informed by operational analysis as part of a larger project with a mixed-methods approach. Building on the tradition of analytic strategic theory cultivated at RAND since the 1950s and examples from history, the authors draw on the operational analysis of joint long-range strike and their understanding of the Chinese nuclear first use drivers presented in Volumes 2 and 3 of this report series to develop an original framework to analyze prospective pathways to nuclear escalation in a U.S.-China conventional conflict and identify implications for U.S. joint long-range strike.

Key Findings

  • There are many pathways to possible nuclear escalation; nuclear use might result from one that seems far-fetched, so even implausible pathways deserve consideration.
  • If fully committed to fighting and winning a war with China, the United States must be prepared for nuclear escalation and place more emphasis on managing these risks.
  • U.S. actions could shape the Chinese nuclear threshold for better or worse.
  • There will likely be a trade-off among military operational utility, force survivability, and escalation management.
  • The single most influential factor under U.S. control for managing escalation is target selection.
  • Munitions can have a direct impact on the U.S. military's ability to manage escalation dynamics.
  • U.S. joint long-range strike actions that are focused on China could have escalatory drivers for other countries.
  • U.S. joint long-range strike activity in the continental United States can still be escalatory even if kinetic strikes are not conducted.

Recommendations

  • Prioritize development of a robust denial capability to minimize nuclear escalation across a variety of mainland strike authorizations, including limited or even no strikes.
  • Seek to optimize the trade-offs between military operational effectiveness and managing escalation, and pay special attention to Chinese perceptions.
  • Develop multiple target sets that accomplish similar high-demand military effects to account for the potential variety of mainland strike authorizations.
  • Ensure sufficient bomber force structure to account for a potential U.S. national command authority decision to prioritize escalation management over force survivability.
  • Ensure sufficient optimal munitions to better manage escalation dynamics.
  • Ensure that the acquisition process considers escalation risks, especially Chinese perceptions, while balancing operational effectiveness, force survivability, and deterrence.
  • Weigh the operational benefits of forward basing against the strategic risks.
  • Consider establishing an “escalation management center of excellence” at Air Force Global Strike Command to ensure consideration through peacetime force development.
  • Ensure that peacetime training considers the implications for shaping Chinese expectations and thus wartime perceptions.
  • Ensure that requirements are set to emphasize force survivability as a key way to minimize the possibility of long-range strike becoming a target of Chinese nuclear use.
  • Ensure that requirements consider Chinese perceptions in all acquisitions for global demands and consider how to mitigate potential impacts for U.S.-China escalation dynamics.

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Geist, Edward, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Nina Miller, Shawn Cochran, Jeff Hagen, David R. Frelinger, Cindy Zheng, William Kim, Elliot Ji, and Alexis Dale-Huang, Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold: Vol. 4, Imagining Escalation Pathways to Chinese Nuclear First Use Via Analytic Strategic Theory, Historical Case Studies, and an Original Analytic Framework. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2312-4.html.
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