As a result of China's secure second-strike nuclear retaliatory capability, the United States must now, more than ever, consider how to tailor its conventional military operations to avoid triggering Chinese nuclear first use. In this report—part of a series—the authors consider the potential thresholds and drivers of Chinese nuclear first use in a conflict scenario in the context of China's evolving nuclear force posture and ongoing nuclear buildup.

Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold

Vol. 3, China's Evolving Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Use Threshold(s)—and Their Future Risk Factors

Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Elliot Ji, Alexis Dale-Huang, Cindy Zheng, Gregory Graff, Dahlia Anne Goldfeld

ResearchPublished Nov 15, 2024

With China as the pacing challenge and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as the pacing scenario, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must balance operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management as it considers its approach to prosecuting a hypothetical future conflict with China. As a result of China's secure second-strike nuclear retaliatory capability, the United States must now, more than ever, consider how to tailor its conventional military operations to avoid triggering Chinese nuclear first use.

This report is part of a series exploring how the U.S. joint force could better balance military operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management in a Taiwan conflict scenario. In this report, the authors consider the potential thresholds and drivers of Chinese nuclear first use in a Taiwan conflict scenario in the context of China's evolving nuclear force posture and ongoing nuclear buildup. Their overarching finding is that, in the event of a fully committed military conflict with China over Taiwan, nuclear escalation will always be a plausible scenario in which no amount of U.S. effort could reduce the risk of escalation to zero. As China's nuclear posture continues to evolve, the United States is now dealing with a China that has a survivable second-strike capability. This suggests that the United States must actively account for how China might interpret and respond to U.S. conventional strikes when planning its operations and be adequately prepared for dealing with Chinese nuclear first use.

Key Findings

  • China's evolving nuclear force structure, especially its secure second-strike capability, requires a different U.S. approach to escalation management in any potential conflict with China.
  • U.S. joint conventional long-range strike is a primary risk driver for Chinese nuclear first use but far from the only risk factor.
  • U.S. kinetic strikes on the Chinese mainland are unlikely to be a binary escalation threshold for Chinese leaders, but mainland strikes still entail escalation risks, and Chinese responses are difficult to predict.
  • Through 2030, China's decisions relating to the doctrinal, domestic-political, and technological aspects of its nuclear posture could introduce additional risk factors to Chinese nuclear escalation in a conflict.
  • DoD must learn to live with Chinese nuclear signaling.
  • The following are six U.S. military actions—or Chinese perceptions that the U.S. military is engaging in such actions—that have the greatest potential to drive Chinese nuclear first use: (1) conventional attacks on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership (decapitation); (2) conventional attacks on nuclear forces, including dual-capable assets and nuclear-related command and control elements; (3) conventional attacks on critical infrastructure, especially those that generate large-scale civilian casualties; (4) conventional attacks on civilian nuclear infrastructure; (5) medium- or high-intensity conventional attacks on major cities and other political or economic centers; and (6) any conventional attack that turns the overall strategic situation disadvantageous to the regime, specifically making the CCP leadership fear for regime or personal survival.

Recommendations

  • DoD should prepare responses to potential Chinese nuclear deterrence signaling. These responses could vary from very publicly shaming nuclear weapon use to limited but intentionally observable increases in U.S. nuclear readiness, such as initiating continuous airborne alert for the U.S. airborne command posts or moving bombers to alert positions and bringing air crews back to ensure a sustainable day-to-day alert posture (as opposed to immediately raising the defense readiness condition).
  • DoD and the broader U.S. government should spend time now planning how they will communicate with China on strategic issues of great consequence in the future.
  • DoD should consider the implications of emerging technologies for the prospects and challenges of U.S.-China escalation management.
  • DoD should consider how to engage with allies and partners over their perceptions of Chinese escalation thresholds and tolerance for escalation risks.

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Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Nathan, Elliot Ji, Alexis Dale-Huang, Cindy Zheng, Gregory Graff, and Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold: Vol. 3, China's Evolving Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Use Threshold(s)—and Their Future Risk Factors. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2312-3.html.
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