This report describes how to evaluate the tactical, operational, and strategic impact of intermediate force capabilities (IFCs), which cause less-than-lethal effects; these include non-lethal weapons, electromagnetic warfare, cyber defense, and information operations. The authors also discuss how IFCs can be better integrated into wargaming, modeling, and simulation to facilitate their usage in U.S. and NATO-wide operations.

Assessing the Impact of Diverse Intermediate Force Capabilities and Integrating Them into Wargames for the U.S. Department of Defense and NATO

Krista Romita Grocholski, Scott Savitz, Sydney Litterer, Monika Cooper, Clay McKinney, Andrew Ziebell

ResearchPublished Jun 27, 2023

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) need to be able to assess the tactical, operational, and strategic impact of intermediate force capabilities (IFCs) — a suite of capabilities that cause less-than-lethal effects and whose impact can be difficult to measure. IFCs include non-lethal weapons (NLWs), electromagnetic warfare (EW), cyber defense, and information operations (IO). NLWs include a highly diverse set of systems, including acoustic hailing devices, eye-safe laser dazzlers, flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets, millimeter-wave emitters that cause a temporary heating sensation, microwave emitters that shut down electronics, and entangling devices to stop vehicles or vessels.

The authors of this report build on a previous report in which they described a method measuring the impact of NLWs in the context of DoD strategic goals (Krista Romita Grocholski et al., How to Effectively Assess the Impact of Non-Lethal Weapons as Intermediate Force Capabilities, 2022). This report updates and expands the previous work to encompass all IFCs and to consider both DoD and NATO strategic goals. The authors present logic models (one for DoD and one for NATO) that link use of IFCs with direct outputs, higher-level outcomes, and strategic goals, and they provide vignettes and metrics that help to characterize when and how IFCs have an impact. The authors also discuss how IFCs can be better integrated into wargaming, as well as associated modeling and simulation (M&S), in ways that can facilitate understanding of them and contribute to their integration into DoD and NATO operations.

Key Findings

  • The previously developed NLW logic model continues to be robust and relevant: The same set of activities, outputs, and outcomes from the earlier logic model strongly support the strategic goals derived from both the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies.
  • The five key outcomes in the DoD NLW logic model are competing effectively and demonstrating resolve while managing escalation; conducting operations in environments that would otherwise be too risky; avoiding alienation of host-nation populations, forces, and governments; enhancing perceptions of U.S. forces, both domestically and internationally; and increasing cooperation with partners.
  • A more expansive NATO-centric logic model, which includes NLWs, IO, EW, and cyber, demonstrates the commonalities and complementarity among these various areas. This corroborates the idea of integrating them under the IFC umbrella.
  • There is a lot of potential value in wargaming IFCs, but also challenges that will need to be overcome in order to do this effectively. Players need to be familiar with the IFCs that are being used and have a clear understanding of the consequences of their uses. Adjudication needs to be credible, despite ambiguity regarding IFC effects; organizers need to avoid them being perceived as "magic." Wargame contexts, scenarios, and levels of conflict need to be crafted specifically to elicit appropriate insights for these unusual systems.
  • In many cases, integrating IFCs into M&S is best accomplished by developing new models, rather than attempting to force them into existing models that were designed for lethal weapons.

Recommendations

  • Use the updated DoD-centric logic model, together with the vignettes and metrics described in the previous report, to help measure, document, and communicate the impact of NLWs within DoD.
  • Use the NATO-centric logic model, metrics, and vignettes to help measure, document, and communicate the impact of IFCs within NATO.
  • Use aspects of the NATO-centric logic model, metrics, and vignettes to help shape DoD's development of the IFC concept.
  • Invest in tailored, IFC-specific M&S to support IFC wargames.
  • Conduct wargames in which IFCs play an integrated role. When doing so, (1) familiarize players with IFCs before the game and at its outset, (2) ensure that the capabilities and effects of IFCs that are used in the game are supported by documentation, and that adjudication of their impact is credible, and (3) allow for second-order effects of IFC usage (such as changed behavior to avoid exposure to IFCs) and direct adversary countermeasures to diminish IFCs' impact.

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Romita Grocholski, Krista, Scott Savitz, Sydney Litterer, Monika Cooper, Clay McKinney, and Andrew Ziebell, Assessing the Impact of Diverse Intermediate Force Capabilities and Integrating Them into Wargames for the U.S. Department of Defense and NATO. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1544-1.html.
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This research was sponsored by the Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office (JIFCO) and conducted within the Navy and Marine Forces Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).

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