An Empirical Assessment of the U.S. Army's Enlistment Waiver Policies

An Examination in Light of Emerging Societal Trends in Behavioral Health and the Legalization of Marijuana

Beth J. Asch, Michael L. Hansen, Rosanna Smart, David Knapp, Daniel Schwam

ResearchPublished Mar 11, 2021

Cover: An Empirical Assessment of the U.S. Army's Enlistment Waiver Policies

Army enlistment standards are intended to ensure that applicants are able to perform military duties successfully and to select those who are the most trainable and adaptable to service life. However, these standards might also inadvertently screen out individuals who could have had successful careers if mitigating factors had been considered. Waiver authority provides the Army with the ability to reconsider initially disqualified applicants and make them eligible to enlist.

Two trends of relevance to Army waiver policy are the dramatic expansion of the legalization of marijuana at the state level and the rising prevalence of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety disorders, and depression among children. Army standards continue to stipulate that applicants who test positive for marijuana require a waiver to be eligible for enlistment, and applicants with a history of ADHD, depression, or anxiety will not meet enlistment standards and might not even qualify for a waiver, depending on their specific case.

To provide information on how the Army can strengthen its waiver policy, especially in light of these societal trends, RAND researchers conducted empirical analyses of the performance of recent recruits who receive waivers, including (but not limited to) those with a documented history of marijuana, ADHD, or depression/anxiety. The authors also examined the extent to which increasing the share of recruits who receive waivers (or who have a documented history of marijuana, ADHD, or depression/anxiety) affects the overall performance of that accession cohort.

Key Findings

Waivered recruits do not always perform worse and sometimes perform better than similar nonwaivered recruits

  • Contrary to expectations, waivered recruits and recruits with a documented history of marijuana or behavioral health conditions are not uniformly riskier across all dimensions. In some cases, they are historically more likely to perform better. The results that most closely conform to expectations are in cases of recidivism, in which accessions with a specific characteristic are more likely to have negative outcomes associated with that characteristic. For example, if a recruit fails to complete the first term, recruits with a documented history of marijuana and recruits with a drug and alcohol waiver are more likely than other recruits to separate because of drug abuse.
  • The performance of an accession cohort would change relatively little if waivers were increased. The same is true with an increase in the share of accessions with a documented history of marijuana or behavioral health conditions.
  • The legalization of marijuana has not resulted in worse recruit outcomes, and there is no strong evidence that changes in marijuana legislation have substantially changed recruit outcomes.
  • The Army likely could do more to offset cases of adverse outcomes among waivered recruits and recruits with a documented history of marijuana or behavioral health conditions. In general, having higher aptitude test scores, having Tier 1 education status (i.e., a high school diploma), or being older (age 22 or older) often fully or partially mitigated the higher likelihood of adverse effects related to performance and misconduct.

Recommendations

  • Recast the message about what a waiver means. The term waiver is not well understood by policymakers and the press, and the term is often mistakenly interpreted as meaning that the Army is lowering standards and enlisting unqualified soldiers. The Army should create, disseminate, and use a clear definition that highlights that all waivered recruits are qualified and eligible to enlist, even if they do not meet every enlistment standard, and that the enlistment standards allow for waivers.
  • To mitigate the higher likelihood of adverse performance-related outcomes, require that waivered recruits and those with a documented history of marijuana or behavioral health issues have Tier 1 education status, have Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores in categories I–IIIA, or be age 22 or older.
  • To mitigate the share of adverse health-related outcomes that comes with an increase in the share of accessions in a cohort who have a weight or medical waiver or a documented history of behavioral health issues increases, require that cohort to also have a higher share of Tier 1, AFQT category I–IIIA, or older (age 22 or older) recruits.
  • Distinguish between recruits with only a documented history of marijuana and those who also have misconduct offenses. The adverse effects of having a documented history of marijuana can be less acute if recruits do not also have misconduct offenses (such as the sale of marijuana). The implication is that the Army should continue to carefully screen recruits with a documented history of marijuana but should be less concerned with these recruits if they have no misconduct offenses.

Topics

Document Details

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

Asch, Beth J., Michael L. Hansen, Rosanna Smart, David Knapp, and Daniel Schwam, An Empirical Assessment of the U.S. Army's Enlistment Waiver Policies: An Examination in Light of Emerging Societal Trends in Behavioral Health and the Legalization of Marijuana. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4431.html.
BibTeX RIS

Research conducted by

This publication is part of the RAND research report series. Research reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND research reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.