Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance

Hans Speier

ResearchPublished 1956

Part of a broader investigation concerned with the politics of German rearmament, the present memorandum discusses atomic blackmail as it applies to West Germany. While the Soviets can exploit the threat-value of their atomic weapons against European members of NATO, a new balance of atomic power will be achieved when individual NATO members acquire their own effective atomic capability. The furtherance of Soviet policy by this type of threat is shown in connection with the recent Middle East crisis.

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Speier, Hans, Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1956. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM1837.html.
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