Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War and the Changing Face of Conflict

Photo by kentoh/Getty Images

The Russia-Ukraine war is the most extensive and destructive European conflict since World War II. The war’s effects have gone far beyond Russia and Ukraine: The conflict has reshaped alliances and partnerships, seen the emergence of innovative technologies and concepts of operations for warfare, and led major powers to rethink how they invest in and allocate resources. As the war unfolds, U.S. and allied policymakers are developing strategies to respond. A comprehensive assessment of the war’s strategic consequences can help inform these responses.

A RAND research team examined the Russia-Ukraine war’s geopolitical and military consequences through fall 2024. The research team used a three-pronged approach: They (1) surveyed similar historical wars to set expectations for the likely effects and aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war; (2) drew on government documents and statements from senior leaders, discussions with subject-matter experts, and open-source research to characterize how states have adapted to the conflict so far; and (3) identified plausible future events or changes that could alter states’ responses to the ongoing conflict and, in turn, affect the findings of the research team’s analysis. The research team’s key findings are shown in the box on the next page.

Historical Parallels Offer Insights About the Russia-Ukraine War

Photo by incamerastock / Alamy Stock Photo

To bound expectations for the war’s likely consequences, the research team assessed 12 previous conflicts similar in size, duration, and scope to the Russia-Ukraine war and excluded civil wars with limited external involvement. These conflicts are shown in Table 1. In studying these previous conflicts, the research team identified several historical patterns that helped bound expectations for the likely effects of the Russia-Ukraine war.

The creation of new regional security arrangements is common, but strategic realignments are rare. Regional conflicts often encourage states to institutionalize existing partnerships or expand areas of cooperation. For example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led the United States to increase cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, thereby establishing a framework for longer-term defense cooperation.

However, strategic realignments, such as new alliances between former rivals or conflict between allies, rarely occur. Such a change happened in only one case: Austria’s decision not to aid Russia during the Crimean War. More often, these conflicts accelerated existing trends. For example, the Korean War hastened the end of the U.S. occupation of Japan and led to the formal security relationship.

States in regional conflicts have incentives to reduce other foreign engagements. The high economic and human costs of intense conflict have often caused states to reduce foreign engagements. For example, Russia turned inward after the Crimean War to conserve its resources for domestic industrialization and national projects, such as rail construction. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the United States revised defense commitments to non-European allies and reduced its posture in East Asia.

Shifts in regional trade patterns to compensate for disruptions from war are common, but systemwide economic reorganizations are rare. Although the economic toll of war might not affect all parties equally, the physical destruction and wasted human and economic capital can hamper trade, disrupt industry, and absorb resources. The British blockade of the Baltic Sea during the Crimean War isolated Russia’s industrializing economy and imposed long-term costs by delaying the adoption of British-origin machinery. Conversely, some countries might benefit from wartime disruptions. The Korean War jumpstarted Japan’s economic recovery, enabling the country to rebuild its industrial infrastructure and rise as a major trading nation.

Diffusion of innovative technologies and operational concepts is common, but game-changing technologies are rare. Wars can reshape how states prepare for future wars by demonstrating new technologies, accelerating the development of new techniques or operational concepts, and showing how previously experimental options perform on the battlefield. For instance, the Crimean War highlighted the value of the telegraph, the steam engine, and electrotyping and spurred advances in military medicine, logistics, and command and control.

However, there were no examples of states introducing novel game-changing technologies. More common were adaptations and refinements of weapons and tactics deployed in previous conflicts, such as the improvements in small arms and military transportation observed during the Russo-Turkish, Boer, and Russo-Japanese Wars. Other conflicts highlighted the operational benefits of existing technologies and led to their broader adoption, such as with helicopters in the Korean War, surface-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions in the Vietnam War, and advanced man-portable air defense systems in the Soviet-Afghan War.

Regional conflicts can shift the balance of political power within involved countries. When internal power shifts occur, they are commonly driven by military defeat rather than by changes in governance or ideology during wars. For example, the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam contributed to the collapse of South Vietnam’s government and the creation of a unified communist Vietnam. More often, wars accelerate political shifts already underway. For example, defeat in the Russo-Japanese War fueled discontent within Russia that contributed to the 1905 Russian Revolution and led to policies that limited democratic reforms.

Using these historical examples, what are the likely consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war? The conflict might

• reinforce existing regional coalitions and alignments
• deepen existing divisions among regional and international factions
• influence global militaries’ use of emerging, innovative military technologies
• test existing regimes and ideologies but not necessarily drive revolutionary changes.

The Conflict Has Highlighted Changes in Warfighting

Photo by Viacheslav Ratynskyi/Reuters

Several features of the combat in Ukraine are likely to reflect changes in the character of high-intensity warfare with several important implications for potential future United States–involved conflicts.

The use of uncrewed systems has become central to warfare. As the use of uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) has become more frequent, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have used one-way attack UASs to deliver payloads at long ranges. Technological advances likely will enable states to develop faster UASs, and UASs are likely to be enhanced with greater autonomy, reducing their vulnerability and improving their agility.

Offensive operations face new challenges. The combination of persistent aerial surveillance and long-range precision fires has conferred an advantage on tactical defense because attacking ground forces are typically more visible and, thus, more vulnerable than defending forces. This shift poses a dilemma for offensive operations: amass forces and risk exposing them to enemy fires, or disperse forces and risk reducing their effectiveness.

Options for delivering mass have expanded. The fighting in Ukraine underscores the importance of mass—the concentration of overwhelming combat power—in winning high-intensity battles. In Ukraine, this mass has been primarily delivered by artillery, but UASs are playing an increased role as massed attack weapons. Given their low cost, UASs could also offer a sustainable complement to artillery in protracted conflicts.

The need to seek external support to sustain protracted conflict is a question of how much, not if. External support is an essential element for waging high-intensity wars over a protracted period. The incentives to seek out external support to sustain or better adapt to protracted high-intensity conflict apply to all states but in varying degrees, depending on a state’s domestic capacity. The value to opponents of preventing or interrupting such transfers will also be proportionate to this domestic capacity.

The war has revealed challenges for U.S. and allied defense industrial bases (DIBs). As requirements for warfighting—such as the need for larger numbers of uncrewed aircraft—have shifted throughout the war, so have requirements for U.S. and European DIBs. In the short term, the war has revealed challenges for Western DIBs, as shown by limitations in the supply of 155 mm artillery shells, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers, and Javelin anti-tank missiles made available to Ukraine.

U.S. and European policymakers will be challenged to prepare for major, prolonged conflicts. The fighting in Ukraine has highlighted the demands of protracted warfare on the combatants and their supporters. U.S. adaptations to these challenges are in the early stages. Modest but positive changes to DIBs since February 2022 include reshaping budgeting and procurement to focus on small UAS production in both U.S. and allied DIBs. However, sustained funding for DIBs faces budgetary and political obstacles and could also pose coordination challenges for the United States and its European allies.

Competency matters as much, if not more, than technology. The conflict has underscored the importance of “soft” aspects of military power, such as tactical proficiency, sound operational planning, and coherent strategy. Therefore, military analysts must devise new ways to measure these intangible aspects of military power for forces untested by battle, and future combatants will need to prioritize the development of such aspects to avoid a painful learning curve once conflict begins.

Whether air superiority can be achieved is critical in shaping the battlefield. Many dilemmas in the Russia-Ukraine war stem from each side’s inability to establish air superiority. Layered air defenses, the effective use of man-portable air-defense systems, and low-cost one-way attack small UASs have constrained traditional air power. Although a similar difficulty in achieving air superiority could arise in a future conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, a potential North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russia war would likely see NATO air forces control the skies, altering some of the dynamics that have shaped the battlefield in Ukraine.

The Conflict Has Produced Major Shifts in the International System

Photo by Stefan Rousseau/Reuters

The impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resounded throughout the international system. Although many of the effects have been incremental rather than revolutionary, the resulting shifts in the international system are nonetheless significant and, in some cases, likely to be long-lasting. The research team examined the war’s geopolitical impact by assessing Europe’s, Russia’s, China’s, and India’s reactions and adaptations to the war and changes to the broader international system and norms.

The war has energized Europe to improve its operational flexibility, but any movement toward strategic autonomy from the United States will likely be limited, absent larger changes in U.S. strategy. Although European states recognize the need to improve their ability to act with reduced U.S. support, they will likely still depend on the United States to play a major role in European security in the medium term. Similarly, the war has led the European Union (EU) to claim a larger defense role in shaping regional defense policies, but the substantial reforms that would enable Brussels to direct collective military action are unlikely because of national differences and the immaturity of existing proposals.

Russia’s position in the international order changed rapidly after the invasion. Prior to the war, Russia maintained transactional relationships with the United States and EU countries, the latter of which were rooted in trade. However, the war has accelerated European countries’ disengagement from Russia, which is likely irreversible now. At the same time, the Russia-China relationship has expanded and gained new urgency because both countries perceive benefits from cooperating to weaken United States–led initiatives.

The war has changed China’s perceptions of Western military capabilities and vulnerabilities. The failure of Russian hybrid warfare—a blend of military and nonmilitary tools, such as information campaigns— to deter military escalation has cast doubt on China’s ability to deter war with the United States. The conflict has redoubled China’s interest in undermining U.S. alliances, which China views as vulnerable because of the perception that these alliances are built on drummed-up crises rather than on common interests. China also perceives a relative advantage in preparations for a protracted war, which it assesses would erode U.S. technological advantages because the U.S. DIB cannot sustain a protracted war.

The Russia-Ukraine war puts India in a predicament. India’s government has worked to maintain a close relationship with Russia and has refused to condemn the invasion or to join Western sanctions on Russia. Its main motivations are the strategic concern posed by its rivalry with China and the fear of driving Russia more closely into China’s orbit. However, Russia’s grand strategy will suffer a major reverse if Russian dependence on China continues to increase.

Condemnation of Russia’s invasion has reinforced international norms against military aggression. Support for Russia’s invasion has been limited to a few pariah states. Even China has refused to publicly endorse the military action. In addition, international efforts to punish Russia economically have employed innovative levers to impose costs. These include barring Russia from the international banking information exchange system, complicating its ability to process transactions with other nations, and raising the cost of oil sales by restricting firms’ abilities to insure tankers carrying Russian oil.

Consequential Events Could Reshape the Conflict’s Impact

Photo by Sputnik/Pavel Volkov/Pool via REUTERS

Future events could alter the consequences and trends that the research team has identified in this analysis. The events that have the greatest potential impact are presented in this section; they include developments that could occur on the battlefield in Ukraine, events related to how the conflict ultimately ends, and outside events that would still have clear implications for the conflict in political or diplomatic terms.

Battlefield Developments

Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons inside Ukraine. This development could undermine the nuclear taboo, which, in turn, could significantly increase the risk to massed combat forces and challenge other central planning assumptions for military operations.

Russia uses a kinetic anti-satellite weapon in low earth orbit against commercial targets that generates massive debris. This development would weaken persistent surveillance capabilities, potentially enhancing the ability for all states to conduct offense operations. This could heighten China’s fears that the international system is unstable and raise expectations for a larger war.

China provides lethal military support to Russia. This development could suggest that Beijing perceives the U.S. capacity for sustained conflict as stronger than expected. This development would also challenge international humanitarian law and raise the question of whether China intends to renounce internal norms against military aggression.

NATO directly intervenes in the Russia-Ukraine war. This development would suggest consensus that materiel and economic support for Ukraine alone cannot achieve regional security goals. This development would also drive an increase in defense production and cooperation and reduce many obstacles to Ukraine’s integration with Europe.

War’s End

How the war ends could influence long-term regional and international effects by shaping views on Russia’s ambitions, European security concerns, and Ukraine’s prospects of integration into Europe. The research team assessed the effects of three possible scenarios on this analysis and its findings.

Russia succeeds in its initial objective for the invasion by militarily imposing a change of government in Kyiv. A clear Russian victory in the war would call into question whether non-Western powers might be able to reshape aspects of the international system. A Russian victory would also likely intensify European DIB reform efforts and drive regional increases in defense spending.

Ukraine succeeds in rolling back the Russian invasion and regains the territory occupied or contested by Russian forces since 2014. Defeating the Russian invasion through sustained international support would reinforce the notion that such violations of norms are costly and that similar aggression would be met with effective opposition. Barring a regime change in Russia, the Kremlin would be unlikely to accept this result and would likely seek to regenerate its forces to attack again. A Ukrainian victory would also entrench Russian hostility toward the West, assuming that the United States and its European allies continue to assist Ukraine.

Ukraine and Russia agree to end hostilities, but Ukraine’s territory remains divided with persistent low-level fighting. Prolonged conflict might reignite debates on indefinite aid and prompt fatigued European citizens to demand that their governments focus on other economic and social issues. Additional costs and legal uncertainty regarding Ukrainian borders would likely prolong EU accession negotiations.

Outside Events

Political or diplomatic developments outside the fighting in Ukraine could alter states’ behavior and influence the international order. The research team highlighted four possible events.

Elections in key EU states, such as Germany, Poland, and France, empower far-left or far-right parties. Far-left or far-right electoral victories could fracture the consensus that has supported European DIB reform and could reduce investments and coordination. Ukraine’s formal integration into the EU and NATO would become unlikely in the short term.

Ukraine receives greater U.S. security guarantees following the end of the war. An expanded U.S. role could reduce European anxiety about U.S. commitment to the region. Russia’s reaction would vary. If assured that the guarantee does not harm Russia’s interests, Moscow might maintain its policies. By contrast, if guarantees are provided over Russia’s objections, Russia might respond aggressively.

The United States withdraws from its alliance commitments in Europe. Most NATO members, including frontline states in particular, would likely accelerate rearmament to counter any perception that U.S. disengagement offers Russia a chance to pursue further territorial aggression in Europe. Calls for Europe to exercise greater strategic autonomy would intensify.

Events within Russia destabilize the country. China’s support for Russia is likely to persist through— and perhaps even intensify during—periods of instability in Russia, but this might not be the case if the regime in Moscow changes substantially. European reactions would depend on the political orientation of the new Russian government and whether there is evidence of fundamental changes to Russian policy.

Crosscutting Findings and Recommendations

Findings

In this analysis, the research team identified six key findings for strategic and military affairs.

Europe’s strategic orientation has shifted. The main effects of the Russian invasion have been to drive a wedge between European nations and Russia (and to some extent, China), while deepening cooperation between the United States and its European allies. If sustained, these effects would likely be the most enduring strategic cost Russia will pay for the war.

Closer Russian-Chinese cooperation raises concerns for the United States. The prospect of closer cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in both peacetime subversion efforts and potential wartime collaboration poses strategic concerns for the United States that will bear close observation.

Closer U.S.-European alignment could help deter conflict in Asia. If sustained, closer alignment with Europe could allow the United States to direct more security resources toward the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, greater alignment on European security could lead to more U.S.-European cooperation on other strategic issues, such as confronting the risk of Chinese aggression against U.S. allies in the Pacific region.

The war has clarified attitudes among Global South nations. The Global South nations, primarily in Africa, Latin America, and Asia—of which India is the largest—have reacted with ambivalence toward the Russian invasion. In general, their hesitance to join in economic sanctions or restrict trade with Moscow has blunted the full force of Western sanctions and suggests a continued drift away from the U.S.-led order.

Economic tools have uncertain values as forms of punishment. Western nations have turned to innovative forms of economic punishment to isolate Russia from the global economy. Yet, the utility of these tools is uncertain. Russia has adapted in ways that circumvent restrictions, and China is likely learning from this experience on how to improve its own countermeasures.

Lessons from Ukraine can apply across theaters and to U.S. defense commitments in Europe. The United States is learning from operations in Ukraine and applying these lessons to the Indo-Pacific region, but less attention has been paid to understanding how these lessons could reshape the U.S. approach to defending allies in other theaters, particularly—and ironically—in Europe. The search for a cost-effective, asymmetrically advantageous means of deterring adversary aggression applies equally across theaters.

Photo by jannik/Unsplash

Recommendations

Drawing on their analytical findings, the research team made recommendations for policymakers at three levels: the U.S. government; the U.S. Department of Defense; and U.S. Air Forces in Europe—Air Forces Africa, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Space Force.

The U.S. government should do the following:

• Increase collaboration, information disclosure, and planning with European allies to address U.S. global concerns. The United States should build closer, more-durable relationships with its European allies by demonstrating its intent to reliably and consistently engage with its European allies and EU leaders across a variety of global strategic issues.
• Provide greater interagency attention to and resources for protecting U.S. and allied political systems from adversary information operations. The United States should expect the breadth and frequency of such attacks to increase, requiring greater governmentwide attention and resources to combat them.
• Continue to refine U.S. and allied economic coercion tools. The United States and its allies threw the metaphorical economic kitchen sink at Moscow, but Russia is adapting and China is learning from Russia’s experiences. The United States should identify alternatives or modifications to these tools to allow them to remain effective in the future in the face of adversary efforts to mitigate such tools.

The U.S. Department of Defense should do the following:

• Focus DIB investments on long-term needs. U.S. and European efforts to boost production capacity are prioritizing Ukraine’s existing warfighting needs and the backfill of donor countries. However, the demands of a conflict involving NATO might be different, and it is unclear production lines might adapt to meet these different needs. Given the time required to build production infrastructure, planning should focus on long-term U.S. and allied requirements for their own forces.
• Update U.S. and NATO plans for deterrence against Russia to more fully incorporate lessons learned from the fighting in Ukraine. The U.S. military has applied insights from the fighting in Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific region, such as the increased role and capabilities of UASs. The U.S. Department of Defense would likely benefit from a more robust effort to identify an asymmetric and efficient means of deterring Russian aggression by leveraging new technologies and battlefield dynamics and incorporating these into NATO defense plans.
• Assess how increasing reliance on UASs affects adversary perceptions. If adversaries perceive that uncrewed systems improve U.S. capability to defeat aggression against NATO allies, this would enhance deterrence. However, if adversaries perceive that increasing UAS deployments indicates a U.S. unwillingness to take casualties in defense of NATO allies, it could increase the risk of miscalculation.

U.S. Air Forces in Europe—Air Forces Africa, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Space Force should

• Examine opportunities to leverage actual and proposed European DIB and infrastructure improvements to support U.S. distributed air operations. The Department of the Air Force and the U.S. Air Forces in Europe should assess whether and when European enhancements could help improve infrastructure features, such as the prepositioning of supplies, availability of runways, and hardening of relevant critical infrastructure, among other logistical challenges.
• Collaborate with Ukrainian and allied air forces to incorporate insights from the war into national, bilateral, and NATO exercises and training. For example, Ukrainian forces’ experience operating in a contested electronic spectrum environment can inform the development of more-realistic training environments.

Although coping with the war’s immediate challenges has been paramount for U.S. policymakers, the effects of the conflict are likely to be far-reaching. The war’s imprint on the international environment is likely to deepen as it continues and as states react to the fighting. Although Ukraine and Russia are the states most deeply affected by the war, the consequences will continue to be felt throughout the international system.

Available for Download

Download PDF

Topics

• Defense Infrastructure
• European Union
• Geopolitical Strategic Competition
• Russia
• Security Cooperation
• U.S.-European Relations
• Ukraine