Evaluating the Risks of Preventive Attack in the Race for Advanced AI
Expert InsightsPublished Sep 30, 2025
Expert InsightsPublished Sep 30, 2025
Will the race for advanced artificial intelligence make war more likely? If technology futurists are right that the advent of artificial general intelligence (AGI) will radically alter the global balance of power, could AGI development tempt states to resort to war to secure those advantages for themselves or to deny them to their rivals? The authors developed a framework of variables that shape pressures for preventive military action and considered how these variables apply to the development of AGI. The authors analyzed three scenarios for preventive military action. The findings suggest that, in absolute terms, the probability of war is low, but preventive attacks appear relatively more likely to occur in an attempt to preserve a monopoly on AGI than in an attempt to prevent one.
This work was independently initiated and conducted within the Technology and Security Policy Center of RAND Global and Emerging Risks using income from operations and gifts from philanthropic supporters. A complete list of donors and funders is available at www.rand.org/TASP.
This publication is part of the RAND expert insights series. The expert insights series presents perspectives on timely policy issues.
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This publication supersedes a previous version published in 2025 (WR-A4005-1).