From Insurgency to Stability

This monograph is the second of two volumes that examine how countries confronting insurgencies transition from a high level of violence to a more stable situation. It examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to identify the key factors necessary for a successful transition. In some of the cases, such as Iraq's Anbar province and Afghanistan, the United States was (or still is) directly involved in combat operations; in the Philippines and Colombia, it played a supporting role; in others, there was little U.S. involvement of any consequence. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved and examine what the government did right — or wrong — to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to stability. They note that in each case, there was a need to understand the participants in the insurgency and the grievances and needs of the local population; to balance security needs with reforms in other areas; and to plan for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militias and government and insurgent forces.