Wartime innovation and adaptation: Supporting Ukraine’s digital transformation

A series of reports on how to optimise Kyiv’s technological and policy advantages as it defends its sovereignty.

A military soldier controls a drone for a reconnaissance operation of enemy positions

Photo by parilov/Adobe Stock

What is the issue?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has driven a series of rapid technological advances on the battlefield, especially around uncrewed systems, electronic warfare, command and control, and surveillance. Staying ahead of the technological curve has kept Ukraine in the fight despite its antagonist’s greater size, but technological advances do not happen in a vacuum – nor is innovation solely a Ukrainian phenomenon. Those advances must be structured in a policy framework which is appropriate to Ukraine's specific needs in order to be maximally effective in keeping the country sovereign and free.

How did we help?

This project was set up to support the Ministry of Digital Transformation’s efforts to maximise Ukraine’s technological advantage on the battlefield, complementing their deep operational knowledge with RAND Europe’s strategic and cross-cutting viewpoint. Throughout this project, RAND Europe employed a mixed-methods research approach combining desk-based literature reviews, stakeholder interviews, expert workshops, and field visits. The research teams reviewed academic, governmental, and grey literature, focusing on unclassified or open-source materials to ensure broad usability and dissemination. Interviews were conducted with a diverse range of subject matter experts – both Ukrainian and international – representing government, military, industry, and civil society perspectives. Field visits to Ukraine provided direct engagement with stakeholders and participation in relevant discussions, such as the Brave1 Defence Tech Innovation Forum. Internal expert workshops were then used to synthesise findings, pressure test assumptions, and identify actionable recommendations tailored to the Ukrainian context.

Findings

Report 1 Learning and remembering under fire: Proposals for a novel doctrinal system for Ukraine

What did we find?

  • Ukraine’s unique operational context requires a doctrinal system distinct from NATO’s, maintaining the strengths of horizontal innovation and rapid lessons-sharing.

What can be done?

  • Traditional, slow peacetime doctrinal cycles are not suitable; a “Doctrinal Wiki” is recommended, combining open access for rapid updates with centralised management and oversight via a Joint Doctrine Cell (JDC).
  • The system should blend classified and open sections, integrate lessons learned in real time, and actively involve both military and civilian stakeholders.
  • Ukraine’s doctrine should enable interoperability with NATO but reflect its distinctive whole-of-society approach and innovative use of uncrewed systems (UxS).

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Report 2 Scoping the Future: Improving Ukraine's awareness of future technologies

What did we find?

  • A suite of futures methodologies – such as horizon scanning, STREAM comparative analysis, robust decision making, and forecasting – can support strategic planning and technology investment under uncertainty.
  • Systematic foresight and scenario planning tools are necessary to anticipate trends, prioritise capability development, and test policy resilience in volatile environments.

What can be done?

  • Integrating futures methods into standard decision-making cycles, investing in technology monitoring infrastructure, and leveraging both probabilistic and deliberative approaches for robust planning are recommended.
  • The adoption of futures techniques will help Ukraine remain agile, avoid strategic surprise, and ensure effective prioritisation of defence investments.

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Report 3 Lessons learned: Understanding the role of military organisational and adaptation culture for the future of Ukraine's defence

What did we find?

  • Ukraine’s experience in the current conflict highlights rapid technological development and the need to strengthen how it captures and applies lessons learned.
  • Its unique military culture blends hierarchy with informal innovation, shaping its learning approach.
  • NATO’s Lessons Learned model offers a useful guide but should be adapted to the Ukrainian context.

What can be done?

  • Formalise off-rotation training to share frontline experience, through full-unit rotations or briefings by returning personnel, in order to strengthen existing informal learning networks.
  • Implement Lessons Learned Officers, Analysis Functions, and Cross-Functional Team structures to embed a lasting lessons-learned culture, drawing on UK and Swedish military examples.
  • Prioritise sharing lessons with experienced units first to model best practice and enable gradual, low-cost adoption across the wider force.

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Report 4 From policy to victory: Recommendations to Ukraine for harnessing defence technology

What did we find?

  • Ukraine’s defence technology ecosystem is characterised by rapid, bottom-up innovation, civilian-military collaboration, and high tolerance for deploying immature technologies.
  • Key weaknesses include overreliance on short-term donor funding, insufficient regulatory frameworks, fragmented demand signals, and production capacity below potential.

What can be done?

  • Opportunities exist for improved oversight, greater utilisation of commercial tech integration, leveraging Ukraine’s battlefield experience internationally, and developing new co-financing models (e.g. expanding the “Danish model”).
  • The report recommends defining inter-ministerial roles, prioritising long-term R&D, strengthening contracting and procurement mechanisms, and enhancing the sustainability of the defence innovation ecosystem.

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Report 5 Tooling up together: How Europe and Ukraine can improve defence industrial collaboration

What did we find?

  • Although international support and willingness for collaboration are high, practical barriers – such as wartime risks, perceptions of corruption, bureaucracy, and unclear procurement processes – are deterring increased European investment in Ukraine’s defence sector.

What can be done?

  • To improve cooperation, Ukraine should further streamline procurement reforms, communicate its requirements and opportunities more clearly, and continue business environment improvements.
  • The Danish model (European-funded purchases from vetted Ukrainian companies) is identified as an effective template and should be expanded; joint ventures and licensing present additional avenues.
  • Ukraine should leverage its testbed status for defence innovation, offer learning and development to partners, and propose joint R&D campaigns to address battlefield challenges collaboratively.

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Report 6 Looking ahead: Enablers of innovation and scale for the future of Ukraine's defence-industrial base

What did we find?

  • Forged by conflict, Ukraine’s defence industry is setting global innovation standards despite tight budgets and regulations. Clarifying its competitive edge will guide long-term industrial planning.
  • Ukraine’s strength lies in its skilled, combat-experienced workforce and strong state-industry alignment, though corruption concerns and unclear demand deter foreign direct investment (FDI).
  • Ukraine’s world-leading UAS industry thrives on high domestic demand fuelled by unsustainably large defence spending. Long-term success will hinge on shifting to exports driven by innovation and skills rather than products.

What can be done?

To address these challenges, the Ministry of Digital Transformation can focus on:

  • Expanding the ‘Danish Model’ of investment-based aid to boost global engagement, prioritise domestic development over equipment sustainment, and attract more long-term prospects for FDI.
  • Developing a skills retention and reshoring strategy, focusing on accelerating the return of skilled Ukrainians to support Ukraine’s longer-term industrial base. This will support efforts to bolster the non-defence economy as Ukraine transitions away from its currently high levels of defence spending as a percentage of GDP.
  • Commoditising Ukraine’s innovation by competing globally as a defence services integrator rather than solely as a product exporter. Despite a crowded and highly regulated UAS market, Ukraine’s rapid development and adaptation remain valuable to allies.

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Report 7 Invisible defender? Opportunities and challenges for integrating DEWs into Ukraine's C-UAS framework

What did we find?

  • Directed energy weapons (DEWs) present an effector option to defeat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that appeals due to their precision, reported range and low cost at point of use.
  • Although several countries are actively exploring DEWs, the technology readiness levels vary significantly, and all come with fundamental constraints in use case and development cost.
  • DEWs should not be a near-term investment focus for Ukraine. Their low at-use costs mask significant R&D investments and the infrastructure requirements and atmospheric sensitivities are significant.

What can be done?

  • Actively monitor the development and deployment of ongoing projects in other nations to assess whether this development area should be prioritised in the future.
  • Develop alternative systems to minimise the opportunity cost and resource distraction of DEW development.
  • Actively monitor the further evolution of low-power, soft-kill, energy output systems within the DEW set as they are likely still expensive and complicated to deploy in the near term.

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Project Team

Additional team members

  • Rebecca Lucas
  • Ondrej Palicka