The world can rightfully celebrate the Gaza ceasefire, the return of the living hostages, and the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian aid. Although the agreement reflects the acceptance of hard realities by both sides, it is hard to imagine reaching this step without the personal intervention of President Trump. The challenge now will be to maintain the momentum through the high hurdles ahead.
Fundamental differences remain. Although Hamas's negotiator claimed “victory” in Cairo, the next phase of the Gaza peace plan calls for Hamas to disarm and demobilize. Hamas fighters are to give up their weapons. Its paramilitary force would be effectively dissolved. Its military infrastructure and weapons manufacturing facilities will be destroyed.
Hamas does not see itself as a defeated force. It will not be easy to persuade its commanders and fighters to agree to provisions they view not simply as surrender, but as apostasy. Abandoning its struggle would violate Hamas's covenant—its own understanding of its duty to God.
According to its 1988 Covenant, Hamas “strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine,” which it considers an Islamic endowment “consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day.” Palestine, the covenant says, has been usurped by the Jews, making it “compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised.” “Resisting and quelling the enemy” is “the individual duty of every Muslim.” “So-called peaceful solutions…are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement.”
Under pressure from Arab governments, Hamas issued a supplement to its covenant in 2017. This dropped the references to killing Jews and redefined the enemy as the “Zionist project.” The supplement also expressed Hamas's willingness to accept an interim Palestinian state—but only as a step toward the liberation of all Palestine “from the river to the sea.” The supplement did not alter Hamas's commitment to its armed struggle, and the language of the orders given by Hamas commanders to their forces prior to the October 7, 2023 attacks reveal the organization's fundamental mindset.
It was not clear how Hamas would adapt to the new situation. Would it choose to go along with the peace plan, temporarily suspending its armed struggle in order to eventually re-emerge as a political and military force in a reconstructed Gaza? Or would it exploit the vacuum left by the pullback of Israeli forces to settle scores and re-assert its authority?
Early indications of Hamas's strategy provide a mixed picture—partial compliance, but continued determination to remain in control.
Early indications of Hamas's strategy provide a mixed picture—partial compliance, but continued determination to remain in control.
Return of the Hostages
The interim agreement called for Hamas to return all hostages, alive and deceased. Israel was understandably suspicious that Hamas would try to retain some hostages to prolong the process as it had before. Negotiating the release of a single Israeli soldier taken by Hamas in 2006 took five years.
Holding remains also provides leverage. In a previous case, Hamas held on to the remains of two Israeli soldiers for over a decade. The remains of one were recovered by Israeli forces in January 2025. The other has not been returned.
Hamas released all of the living hostages, but in the following days, it returned the remains of only 15 of the deceased hostages, leaving 13 unreturned. Hamas claimed that it could find no more. The level of destruction in Gaza certainly has made recovering remains difficult. It is also possible that the remains of some of the deceased hostages unaccounted for may be held by other factions. Tragically, as in all wars, some may never be recovered.
Is Hamas again dragging its feet, holding on to the remains as a means of strengthening its hand in forthcoming negotiations? Any attempt by Hamas to link progress on returning the remains to other issues would be met with fury.
The Hostages and Missing Families Forum and Israeli government called Hamas' failure a brazen violation of the agreement. Under intense domestic pressure to resolve the situation and seeing minimal effort by Hamas to locate the bodies, the Israeli government announced that it would limit aid to Gaza until the remaining bodies are returned. This could remain a contentious issue for months—years.
One need only recall the intense emotion, suspicions of a cover-up, and lasting anger in the United States regarding the POW/MIA issue which persisted for decades after the Vietnam War. POW/MIA flags are still prominently flown at police and fire stations, gas stations and other private locations. Legislation passed in 2020 mandated flying the POW/MIA flag at specific federal sites.
Who Will Rule Gaza?
As soon as Hamas fighters could emerge from their tunnels, they attacked rival factions and carried out public executions of those it accused of being collaborators. It is not clear whether these actions represent a spasm of score settling or further battles will occur. Hamas said it would halt the executions. But tensions remain. Security conditions can deteriorate rapidly.
The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty that ended the Irish War of Independence led to civil war in Ireland. The end of M-19's insurgency in Colombia in 1990 led to an assassination campaign of its former leaders, destroying its envisioned transition to a political party. By displaying violence now, Hamas is making it clear that it is in charge and that a peaceful environment depends on its cooperation.
Will Hamas Agree to “Decommission” Its Weapons?
This will be the highest hurdle to overcome in the phase II negotiations. Prime Minister Netanyahu warned that Israel will resume military operations if Hamas is not disarmed. However, Hamas officials have said that disarmament is totally ruled out and not negotiable. President Trump said that he communicated with Hamas, warning them that “If they don't disarm, we will disarm them. And it will happen quickly and perhaps violently.” The president said they agreed.
Giving up weapons is always the biggest challenge in negotiations to end guerrilla wars and terrorist campaigns. Militants don't see negotiations as a transition from war to peace, but rather as a continuation of the armed struggle by other means. Turning over weapons admits to defeat. Regular armies can return to their barracks. For extremists, disarmament means extinction.
Guns have political and psychological importance to entities like Hamas. Governments come to negotiations with a legitimacy advantage. Hamas fighters shot their way to the negotiating table—their status derives from violence. Their guns symbolize enduring commitment to their cause. They provide the group with continuing leverage, while allowing its leaders to maintain internal discipline and keep its fighters ready to resume fighting.
Hamas fighters remain committed to extremist views, inculcated since childhood by the Hamas-run education system, but they also joined for personal reasons—vengeance plays a big role. Reportedly, a significant percentage of Hamas fighters in early 2024 were orphans of previous wars in Gaza. No doubt, many of those who joined Hamas since 2023 lost relatives in the current war or saw their livelihoods destroyed by the fighting.
Bearing arms contributes to camaraderie, a sense of membership in a brotherhood, a collective identity that is lost with disarmament. Giving up a gun means abandoning what has become a way of life in return for an uncertain future. It leaves men feeling defenseless, isolated, emasculated.
Persuading rebel forces and terrorist groups to decommission their weapons has been a complicated issue in resolving past conflicts. To decrease resistance, verify compliance, and satisfy other interests has often required exquisite choreography and external intervention.
Following the 1992 Peace Accords, Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador destroyed their arms caches outside of El Salvador under the supervision of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador.
After decades of failed attempts, the most recent negotiations to end the long-running insurgency by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) saw thousands of FARC members “laying down” their arms under U.N. supervision rather than “disarming.” However, some dissidents who rejected giving up their weapons broke away to create new armed formations, joined Colombia's other still-active insurgent groups, or found employment with narcotraffickers. And hundreds of those who laid down their weapons were subsequently killed by diehards who considered them traitors or were targets of revenge killings for past FARC kidnappings and killings.
Persuading the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and loyalist paramilitary groups to decommission their weapons took years of negotiations after the 1998 Good Friday Accords ended the fighting, and another four years to complete. The IRA refused to turn its weapons over to the British, but agreed to instead put its weapons “completely and verifiably beyond use.” IRA brought their weapons from secret arms dumps to inspectors under the auspices of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning headed by a Canadian general.
The weapons were disassembled and sealed in concrete. No news media coverage was permitted and no photographs were published, but the process was officially witnessed by a Catholic priest and a Methodist minister.
The Basque separatist group ETA agreed to a final permanent ceasefire in 2011, but it took until 2017 to decommission its arsenal of firearms and explosives. In this case, the group handed its weapons over to French authorities. A French Basque group assisted the process.
In all of these cases, negotiators sought ways to ensure an orderly process that avoided humiliating the fighters while confirming that the weapons had been decommissioned. All involved international supervision and verification.
And in all four cases, those surrendering arms looked forward to some form of future participation in government, at least through their political wing. The 20-point peace plan, however, precludes Hamas from having any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form.
Some see flexibility in Hamas's position. Egypt has said that Hamas is willing to “freeze” its weapons. That appears to mean it will hold but not use them except in defense. Since Hamas sees Israelis as having usurped Palestinian land, the concept of defense would appear malleable. Hamas might try to keep its firearms and light weapons, but give up its remaining rockets. Israel would not likely see a promise to hold on to but not turn its weapons over as decommissioning. And Hamas could rapidly manufacture new rockets.
Will Hamas Members Receive Amnesty?
The peace plan calls for “Hamas members” to commit to peaceful coexistence in exchange for amnesty, implying that this is an action required of individuals. Will the offer of amnesty extend to Hamas members who committed atrocities? According to human rights organizations, the attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023 included war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the chief prosecutor of the International Court sought arrest warrants for Hamas leaders. (Without admitting guilt, Israel could demand that any amnesty offered to Hamas would automatically extend to Israeli soldiers and officials.)
Amnesties historically have taken years to resolve. The initial Good Friday Agreement with the IRA did not include formal amnesty, although some imprisoned IRA members were given early releases and some fugitives were informed that they would no longer be pursued. In 2023, the UK parliament passed a bill providing conditional immunity for acts committed during the Troubles, but this was rejected by a Belfast court. The matter remains unresolved.
FARC rebels in Colombia received amnesty for minor offenses conditional on surrendering arms, but not for war crimes or crimes against humanity. Lenient sentences for those who confessed to the thousands of murders and kidnappings carried out by FARC were a major issue. After a public referendum rejected the original terms of 2016, a revised bill was passed by the Colombian congress.
In South Africa, amnesty was part of a “truth and reconciliation” commission. It is difficult to envision that occurring in the current situation in Gaza.
Can Hamas Fighters Be Repurposed?
While demobilizing Hamas seems desirable, paradoxically, it can create new dangers. As the United States learned in Iraq, suddenly demobilized and unpaid Iraqi soldiers joined the armed resistance, escalating and prolonging the conflict.
Unemployed and untethered Hamas soldiers could carry out lone operator terrorist attacks. Or they could drift into criminal gangs. With aid pouring in and large-scale reconstruction envisioned, there will be ample opportunities for theft and extortion. Either of these developments would directly threaten the conditions necessary to carry out the commercial activities envisioned in the peace plan.
Ways to pay Hamas fighters to perform tasks that contribute to reconstruction should be explored. The Muslim Brotherhood, which began in the 1920s and of which Hamas is an offshoot, was originally a spiritual and social movement that performed social services and set up hospitals, schools, sports clubs, and business enterprises. Gaza has vast needs and Hamas has a disciplined force.
Former fighters could become caregivers, medics, emergency responders, unexploded ordnance specialists—a continuation of a nonviolent jihad focused on people rather than territory.
Former fighters could become caregivers, medics, emergency responders, unexploded ordnance specialists—a continuation of a nonviolent jihad focused on people rather than territory.
How Will the International Stabilization Force Interact with Hamas?
One of the key components of the 20-point peace plan is the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), scheduled to deployed by November 1, but the ISF may not be prepared to enter an ongoing conflict zone.
The ISF is envisioned as an interim enterprise to maintain order while a permanent Palestinian force can be recruited and trained, in a sense a scaffold between Hamas's current control and an eventual Palestinian gendarmerie. The composition of the ISF is still subject to negotiations. Israel may veto certain participant countries and will likely object to the idea of an eventual Palestinian police force under the Palestinian Authority. What is envisioned as temporary could have a long lifespan.
The peace plan calls for the ISF to take charge of the decommissioning process. The states that contribute personnel to the ISF will not likely see their mission as ensuring the disarmament and demobilization of Hamas, let alone be seen as Israel's enforcer. Decommissioning might work better under the auspices of a separate entity yet to be created.
Hamas will still be a powerful armed force and in control of much of Gaza's population when the ISF arrives. How will the two forces interact? As a rough comparison, consider the relationship between Lebanon's national army and Hezbollah in the early 2000s. The two forces coexisted, with the Lebanese Armed Forces representing national sovereignty but Hezbollah clearly being the more powerful entity.
In Gaza, the ISF may end up policing the streets and guarding certain facilities, but otherwise avoiding confrontations with Hamas, which appears determined to remain the de facto power.
One lesson learned from past interventions: The scale of the initial deployment of forces comprising the ISF should be overwhelming—not to win a fight, but to avoid one. As conditions allow, the force can be reduced. U.N. backing could be helpful for optics and legitimacy, but it also raises other complications.
Anticipate Lengthy Negotiations
The accelerated negotiations leading to the agreement between Israel and Hamas on first steps catapulted negotiations to the next phase. Maintaining momentum is critical. The title of the document agreed to by Israel and Hamas is Implementation Steps for President Trump's Proposal for a Comprehensive End of Gaza War. On October 13, President Trump, along with the presidents of Egypt and Türkiye, and the Emir of Qatar signed a separate document in Egypt entitled The Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity.
As these titles indicate, the underlying concept of the Gaza peace plan is that the potential for enduring peace, prosperous coexistence, and—for Palestinians—the promise of “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” will entice Palestinians and Israelis to subdue their differences—and ignore contradictions in the plan—long enough to allow the economic and political developments that will transform their reality.
But one of the takeaways from negotiations ending past insurgencies and terrorist campaigns is that agreements involving disarmament, demobilization, and amnesties are the most difficult to reach. They can take years to work out and require sustained detailed attention. If negotiations falter, they falter here.
