Strengthening Compliance and Verification Under the Biological Weapons Convention

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) faces unprecedented challenges in an era when emerging biotechnologies and artificial intelligence have fundamentally transformed the biosecurity landscape. Traditional approaches to verification and compliance, primarily focused on pathogen watchlists and facility inspections, are increasingly inadequate for addressing a complex spectrum of potential biological threats.

This paper proposes a comprehensive framework that could inform and support discussions on compliance and verification in the context of the BWC. At its core, the framework recognizes verification as a process for judging compliance rather than as a binary assessment. This nuanced approach acknowledges that the global proliferation of 'dual-use' biological research technologies (that are designed for beneficial purposes but could be misused) makes it impossible to treat verification as questions requiring a simple yes/no response.

The proposed framework introduces three fundamental objectives for verification: building confidence among States Parties about responsible state behaviour; creating mechanisms to deter potential non-compliance; and establishing mechanisms for detecting noncompliance in trigger scenarios.

To achieve these objectives, the framework advocates for a data-driven approach that triangulates multiple sources, including Confidence-Building Measures, World Health Organization (WHO) International Health Regulations reporting, and implementation matrices from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 as a start point.