Why Peace Talks Fail in Ukraine
Learning the Right Lessons From Three Years of Grinding War and Faltering Negotiations
ResearchPosted on rand.org May 12, 2025Published in: Foreign Affairs (May 8, 2025)
Learning the Right Lessons From Three Years of Grinding War and Faltering Negotiations
ResearchPosted on rand.org May 12, 2025Published in: Foreign Affairs (May 8, 2025)
It has been nearly three months since U.S. President Donald Trump launched a major effort to bring the war in Ukraine to an end. The diplomatic exchanges that followed have yet to produce meaningful results. In Russian President Vladimir Putin, Trump faces a crafty, experienced adversary who hopes to capitalize on the American president’s impatience with the war to coerce Ukraine into signing away what the Russians have failed to win by force on the battlefield.
There is no reason to think that Trump will acquiesce to Putin’s list of demands. In fact, he has repeatedly voiced frustration with the lack of progress in the talks and has threatened to walk away, as Russia continues to creep forward, inch by bloody inch, in a long war of attrition with no end in sight.
Amid all the recent proposals and counterproposals, threats and counterthreats, reexamining the last real attempt to bring this war to a negotiated end can help inform the current effort. In 2024 in Foreign Affairs, we delved into the history of the talks that began in the war’s first weeks and which, by the end of March 2022, had produced the so-called Istanbul Communiqué, a framework for a settlement. The core bargain in the framework would have entailed Ukraine embracing permanent neutrality, foreclosing its possible membership in NATO, in return for ironclad security guarantees. The sides failed to finalize the deal in the subsequent months, and the war has now entered its fourth year.
With talks once again underway after a three-year hiatus, it is a good time to review the lessons of Istanbul and assess what can be learned from that process for the present diplomatic effort. Of course, much has changed in the intervening period, so the Istanbul framework itself is unlikely to be the starting point for the current talks. But that attempt offers broader lessons that can inform today’s negotiations. The primary imperative for both sides in any agreement will be ensuring their long-term security. All parties whose interests are at stake in the negotiations need to be at the table; if they are not present, they could undermine any agreements. The lack of Western willingness to provide Ukraine security guarantees has been a major challenge to reaching a settlement; it remains an impediment. A belligerent’s optimism about its battlefield prospects can also diminish its interest in making a deal. And finally, the humdrum mechanics of a cease-fire are no less crucial than the high politics of agreeing on the postwar order. Both must be pursued simultaneously if the parties expect to bring this bloody, grinding war to a stop.
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