The Arctic is no longer a frozen frontier of scientific research and melting ice. Once viewed as a geostrategic backwater, the region has become central to the ambitions of the world's most powerful states. From the United States' push for dominance through icebreaker fleets and military outposts, to Russia's aggressive remilitarisation and China's quiet economic inroads, the race for Arctic influence is heating up. Amid these shifting dynamics, an unexpected opportunity has emerged for the West. By strategically engaging China, the United States and Europe could fracture the fragile Moscow–Beijing alignment and contain Russian ambitions in the High North.
The past decade has seen a significant renewal of interest in the Arctic for the United States. The Obama administration published the country's first Arctic strategy (PDF) in 2013, explicitly to tackle climate change and governance issues in the region. The Biden administration followed with a new National Strategy for the Arctic Region (PDF) in 2022, emphasising the need to counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence. Requirements for more icebreakers were among the necessary conditions for ensuring American security and influence in the Arctic. This objective was embraced by the second Trump administration, promoting the need for dozens of new platforms in the first months of the presidency.
The return of Donald Trump also saw a renewed push for the acquisition of Greenland. Home to the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) which houses early warning radar systems for the U.S. armed forces, the autonomous territory of Greenland is a critical component of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and as a consequence of the North American security architecture. Considering the territory's close ongoing cooperation with the United States, President Trump's insistence on acquiring Greenland came as a surprise both to its devolved government and to the central government of the Kingdom of Denmark in Copenhagen.
America's push to play a bigger role in the Arctic is a game changer for a region used to being considered on the periphery. European NATO allies have generally aligned with Washington's framing of Russia and China as a single challenge in the Arctic. However, China's record of retreating from Arctic ventures under political pressure suggests a more cautious and pragmatic posture. The disparate responses of Russia and China to U.S. ambitions in Greenland reveal that their interests in the Arctic are not as aligned as often assumed, an opening the West should explore.
The disparate responses of Russia and China to U.S. ambitions in Greenland reveal that their interests in the Arctic are not as aligned as often assumed, an opening the West should explore.
In a 2025 speech at the Arctic Forum in Murmansk, President Putin minimised U.S. interest in Greenland as a matter between Washington and Copenhagen, but he simultaneously vowed to bolster Russia's leadership in the Arctic. Moscow criticized U.S. and NATO activity as aggressive and warned against any infringement on Russian sovereignty. Significantly, Putin drew a distinction between American and NATO actions, in an attempt to exploit potential divisions between the United States and its European allies, whose proximity to the Arctic and Russia puts their security more directly at stake.
While Moscow left the door open for economic cooperation with a Trump-led U.S. (particularly in mining), it remains committed to portraying itself as the Arctic's gatekeeper. Under the ideology of “Arctic exceptionalism”, this particularly includes opposing perceived incursions of non-Arctic powers. Strategic documents like the “Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2035” and the 2023 “Foreign Policy Concept” underscore the Arctic as a top-tier priority in Russia's great power identity.
The remilitarization and military expansion are key tools for the defence of Moscow's sovereignty over the area and its status, as mentioned in the Maritime Doctrine of 2022. For example, investments in the Northern Fleet were not cancelled even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and included advanced weapons like the Yasen-M class nuclear submarine (nicknamed Arkhangelsk) and, more recently, MiG-31 interceptors. Former Soviet military bases and naval facilities have also been refurbished extensively to increase forward presence.
The Arctic also has a significant economic dimension for Russia as a rich source of oil, gas, and other natural resources, and a key transport region due to the Northern Sea Route project (Sevmorput). It represents a tool for local development with a global impact of shortening the deliveries between production centres in Asia and consumers in Europe. However, as the above-mentioned documents prove, Russian strategic planning subordinates economic objectives to security concerns.
While Russia's Arctic strategy includes significant economic elements, Washington should not assume this will come at the expense of Moscow's military priorities. No thaw in U.S.–Russia relations is likely to diminish the Kremlin's determination to remain the dominant power in the region. Moscow views the Arctic through the lens of hard power and strategic balance, paying far more attention to NATO's enlargement and military build-up than to the day-to-day policies of any U.S. administration. From this perspective, any increase in the capabilities of other Arctic actors is seen as a direct challenge, a zero-sum disruption of regional equilibrium. Complicating this balance further is China's growing influence in the Arctic, which adds a new layer of uncertainty for both Washington and Moscow.
Despite the predominance of Russia, China is now perhaps the most important driver of the American balancing strategy in the Arctic. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to its increasing reliance on Chinese investments to sustain its Arctic strategy. China has for instance incorporated Russia's Sevmorput into its “Polar Silk Road” project, and Chinese companies invested significantly in the Arctic ports, shipping, and resource mining infrastructure, often substituting Western investment. Once framed as a scientific domain by China, the Arctic was redefined in the late 2010s as a key geostrategic area under the Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to integrate the Arctic into a broader network of intercontinental trade routes.
China's interest in the Arctic predates its partnership with Russia, however. The country recognised the strategic significance of the Arctic as early as two decades ago, when the Chinese Academy of Sciences established the Polar Science Committee, well before the United States began to give comparable attention to the region. Beijing's interest has intensified markedly, culminating in its attainment of a permanent observer seat on the Arctic Council in 2013, an act emblematic of its broader geopolitical aspirations. In tandem with this development, China proclaimed itself a near-Arctic state (PDF), thereby asserting a position of legitimacy and long-term stakeholding in polar affairs.
China's Arctic ambitions have increasingly converged with Russian strategic interests, particularly in the aftermath of the breakdown of Western cooperation with Moscow, creating a strategic void that Beijing has been quick to exploit. By leveraging its economic influence, China has positioned itself as a pivotal partner for Russia, facilitating natural gas exports and trade relations amid Western sanctions. This alignment was exemplified by the China National Petroleum Corporation's 2013 acquisition of a 20% stake in the Yamal LNG project. This engagement deepened with a 2017 agreement to develop the Polar Silk Road and a 2019 investment in LNG-2.
By leveraging its economic influence, China has positioned itself as a pivotal partner for Russia, facilitating natural gas exports and trade relations amid Western sanctions.
However, China's push for the “internationalization” of the Arctic seems to conflict with Russia's policy of non-interference from non-Arctic states. Unfortunately for Russia, China is not alone anymore in this trend. Denmark proved willing to seek European solidarity over the United States' claims on Greenland, with French President Emmanuel Macron invited to deliver a speech in Nuuk affirming the support of Europe. Interestingly, Chinese state media requoted President Macron's pledge for European unity over Greenland uncritically, contrasting with Russia's distrustful views of the EU's influence in the region. Such discrepancies in the strategic thinking (PDF) of both great powers has the potential to gradually create a cleavage in the relationship.
This is partly why China's presence in the Arctic remains geographically and operationally limited despite its stated ambitions in the region. Chinese companies have pursued various ventures to exploit natural resources, invest in infrastructure, and acquire land, but with limited success. Profitability concerns halted projects like oil exploration in Iceland's Dreki area and the Isua iron ore field in Greenland. Additionally, Arctic states have tended to resist Chinese investments, exemplified by Denmark's 2018 decision to refurbish Greenland airports independently, and the suspension of the Arctic corridor project connecting the region to continental Europe.
China's limited but growing presence in the Arctic still poses distinct security risks, particularly in communications, infrastructure, and transportation, areas with the highest potential for military and intelligence threats. While natural resource extraction is mainly concerning when linked to infrastructure control, science diplomacy and knowledge development present minimal risks. Despite its unfulfilled Arctic ambitions, China still views the region as a long-term investment, hoping to become a polar great power by 2030.
Although Chinese ambitions in the Arctic are concerning to the United States, they concurrently remain a potential source of embarrassment for Russia. America and Europe therefore have a card to play by crafting a more functional relationship with China in the Arctic, particularly around the exploitation of natural resources. By accommodating China's comparatively limited ambitions, the U.S. and Europe would paradoxically force Russia to accept a more internationalized Arctic, where state sovereignty and the rule of law prevail. Simultaneously, they should focus on current territorial interests and enhance their posture across several critical domains, including polar navigation, special operations, and surveillance capabilities to legitimise their presence in the region, like Denmark pledged to do in Greenland. Such a move would help to reconcile traditional Arctic and non-Arctic partners within NATO while defusing the West vs Russia/China narrative that the Kremlin is so keen to push.
