America is a maritime nation, and its security and prosperity are inexorably linked to the sea. Yet the United States has let its ability to design, build, and sustain the fleet of ships that are the backbone of this prosperity atrophy. A maritime nation that cannot build ships cannot long thrive.
At the same time, U.S. competitors have not sat idle. China has harnessed its state-directed industrial policy to become the dominant actor in the global maritime sector. The United States should turn to those allies that possess the capacity, industrial expertise, and political willingness to partner in a shipbuilding renaissance, South Korea and Japan. Both nations have large and successful commercial shipbuilding industries that employ the latest innovations in industrial efficiency, computer-aided design, and robotics. Both are also close naval partners with the United States, with warships operating the same combat systems and radars.
Together, as maritime nations, there is an opportunity to intelligently leverage the decades of collaboration behind us into more robust future.
Now is the time to act, the opportunity for a cooperative shipbuilding renaissance has not been higher for decades. The current U.S. administration has clearly laid out the priority of shipbuilding both with executive orders and investments to match. In parallel, South Korea has seized the moment by launching the “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA)” initiative, with monetary commitments and the purchase of the Hanwha Philly Shipyard. In the U.S. Congress, momentum is building as well with the Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security (SHIPS) Act being revived to inject federal funds and incentives into ports and domestic yards. Senate leadership supports these efforts and is eager to implement them. Senator Tim Kaine, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, speaking to an audience of defense and maritime industry professionals said about the Hanwha Philly Shipyard and AUKUS agreement, “it makes us think a little bit bigger, not just about this particular alliance but about technology sharing, about joint investments.” With these pieces in place, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo must turn alignment into action.
The opportunity for a cooperative shipbuilding renaissance has not been higher for decades.
Leadership in the three capitals must begin concrete steps to lock in the potential gains of collaboration before momentum fades. That means moving quickly from broad commitments to specific, tangible results such as joint ship programs, continued shared yard investment, and streamlined procurement agreements rather than letting bureaucracy, export controls, or industrial protectionism stall progress. The breadth of potential options for collaborative shipbuilding is vast, ranging from subcontracting relationships and straightforward commercial investments to full joint acquisition of major defense articles on the scale of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. That scope could be overwhelming, and not every idea will be feasible or advisable. But some promising initial projects stand out as candidates to explore further like dual use strategic sealift vessels, naval ship codesign and coproduction, and innovation for the uncrewed future.
Strategic sealift would be a smart entry point into larger collaborative efforts. In a major conflict, the strategic sealift fleet is the logistics backbone moving tanks, fuel, ammunition, and supplies across oceans. The U.S. merchant marine, managed under the Maritime Administration (MARAD), serves as a critical enabler for the U.S. military. However, MARAD is a civilian agency, under the Department of Transportation, and thus free from many of the more complex restrictions surrounding military acquisition. The U.S. Merchant Marine has withered from thousands of ships in the cold war to fewer than 200, many of which are nearing the end of their service lives. These vessels are far less complex than warships, making them more comparable to the roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) carriers, LNG tankers, and cargo transports that Korean and Japanese yards already produce. This makes strategic sealift the natural and relatively low risk starting point for allied shipbuilding collaboration.
There are several categories of ships associated with U.S. merchant marine activities. Some are government owned outright but many others are privately owned and operated, available to be requisitioned or contracted by the government in crisis. Collaborative programs could build a fleet of “dual use” ships that meet normal commercial requirements but are designed with a baseline of “national defense features,” making them viable for MARAD programs. The Maritime Security Program (MSP) is one of the main categories of such ships and maintains a fleet of commercially viable, military ships, largely RO/RO, containerships, and a few heavy lift ships. The MSP fleet is available to support U.S. Department of War (DoW) sustainment sealift requirements during times of conflict or in other national emergencies. Under a collaborative program, civilian car carriers could be fitted with hardened decks and wide turn radiuses making them suitable to also transport heavy armor. Cargo ships could be designed with fire-suppression and blast-protection systems that allow them to safely carry ammunition. The Tanker Security Program (TSP) performs a similar function for liquid fuel carriers, ensuring a core fleet of tankers that can operate competitively in international trade while enhancing U.S. supply chain resiliency for liquid fuel products and providing the DoW with assured access to product tank vessels that may be used during a national emergency. Tankers, built in yards like Hanwha Philly Shipyard, could be fitted with the appropriate safety standards for military grade fuels and pre-certified for entry into the TSP program. Some ships could receive modifications to be fitted with Consolidation stations required to refuel military logistics ships at sea. These changes are marginal compared to the design of a surface combatant or a submarine; however, they would serve as a sensible entry point for shipbuilding collaboration and give the U.S. government a flexible, ready pool of ships to call upon.
The U.S. government has tools to encourage this kind of dual-purpose fleet. Subsidies, targeted tax incentives, or expanding the concept of Foreign Trade Zones to cover allied yards building these vessels could all make it commercially viable. There are additional provisions in the proposed SHIPS Act that could be applied here. The Maritime Security Trust Fund could provide a source of funding. The 25 percent investment tax credit for shipyard investments would assist in expanding the yards necessary to build these ships. A cooperative sealift program would simultaneously strengthen the U.S. commercial fleet, give allies like Korea and Japan access to U.S. markets, and ensure the Pentagon has ships built for peace but ready for war.
A higher-reward but more complex option is codevelopment, codesign and coproduction of future surface combatants. The United States already has legal and policy pathways to partner on defense development, and precedent for multinational programs exists (the F-35 is the obvious example). The Navy has also demonstrated its interest in building on proven foreign expertise in ship design, such as having considered several allied designs before ultimately selecting the Franco-Italian FREMM for the Constellation class. Statutory limits on foreign construction of ships can be managed either through existing waiver authorities or tailored implementation structures that preserve critical U.S. control. Recent practical steps demonstrate the ability and willingness of the United States to accomplish this type of work. Through the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Security Cutter program, the United States will acquire four icebreakers from Finnish shipyards, repairs of USNS hulls in Korean yards, and the repairs of USS John S. McCain in Japan, all of which show policy and industry operators are willing to push past old assumptions, even to the point of work being done overseas.
U.S. naval shipbuilding has struggled to deliver recent small-ship programs on time, on budget, and at full capability. Both the littoral combat ship (LCS) and the Constellation class have suffered programmatic shortfalls, despite the Constellation being based on a foreign design. That opens a window for expanded allied cooperation. Korea and Japan are natural partners: both already operate U.S. AEGIS-equipped destroyers and have moved into exports and cross-border builds (such as Japan's Mogami export to Australia; Korea's Incheon-derived Jose Rizal-class frigates built for the Philippines). A jointly designed and produced warship would be the fullest expression of the idea and the most ambitious, but cooperation can scale. The three countries could start with shared understanding of modern design standards, as well as establishing a series of Data Exchange Agreements (DEA) between Naval Sea Systems Command, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA), and Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) with appropriate provisions protections to transfer classified information. These exchanges could be the foundation for an agreement to build a common, modular hull, produced in allied yards and able to be fitted with national combat modules—radar, weapons, and software—either abroad under strict controls or in U.S. yards during final outfitting. This approach is suggested by former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral (Ret.) John Richardson, “Jones Act implications can be handled with wise carve-outs. Maybe they build hulls; we bring them here and outfit sensors, combat systems, software—our strengths—making the ship ours.” The approach reduces cost and risk, speeds production, and preserves sovereignty over sensitive systems. The key is to move quickly from concept to a prototype program.
Collaboration need not be limited to welding steel. The allies can also learn from each other on conceptual and organizational approaches to ship design and fleet employment. The U.S. Navy is moving aggressively toward uncrewed systems as part of its future fleet, testing a range of prototypes and concepts. Even in its manned fleet, the cost of personnel is forcing more automation and leaner crews. That was one of the original promises of the LCS program—smaller crews and lower operating costs—even if execution fell short. Japan's new Mogami-class frigate, designed for a crew of just 90 sailors compared to more than 300 on an Arleigh Burke–class destroyer, provides a model of what is achievable with automation and thoughtful design. Korea, too, has applied advanced digital shipyard processes and robotics that translate directly into reduced manpower requirements afloat. These are the kinds of innovations that U.S. and allied navies should share more deliberately.
To capitalize on shared experience, the allies should exchange technical data and design concepts on automation, machine-assisted systems, and human-systems integration.
To capitalize on shared experience, the allies should exchange technical data and design concepts on automation, machine-assisted systems, and human-systems integration. U.S. maritime leaders are excited about the prospect of bringing the efficiencies developed in Asia to U.S. yards. Admiral (Ret) Jamie Foggo described what he believes the United States can learn to overcome in workforce difficulties in the United States, “[I]n South Korea I saw yards building four LNG tankers in one dry dock, one block every three days. One robot equals 50 workers; two workers can control 20 robots—do the math.” Through the engineer and scientist exchange program (ESEP) they could embed specialists in naval design bureaus to cross-pollinate ideas, particularly in areas like industrial-organizational psychology and human factors engineering. At the operational level, military exchange personnel (MPEP) should be stationed aboard foreign minimally manned ships to learn new operating concepts and leadership models distinct from the manpower-intensive vessels of the 1990s and 2000s. This kind of collaboration—focused on people, processes, and concepts—would amplify the impact of joint shipbuilding. By pooling lessons in automation, unmanned operations, and reduced crewing, the United States, Korea, and Japan can accelerate the transition to a more resilient, affordable, and interoperable allied fleet.
America is a maritime nation—dependent on the sea for its prosperity and bound to it for its security. Today, leaders on both sides of the Pacific recognize the need to revitalize shipbuilding and the broader maritime industry. The United States cannot take on this task alone. Korea and Japan are proven technical leaders in shipbuilding, close allies, and willing partners. For all these reasons, collaborative efforts in ship design, construction, and innovation are not just logical but essential. The voyage to return to a robust and resilient maritime industrial base should not be taken alone. Instead, the United States and its allies should embrace the spirit of katchi kapshida—“we go together.”
