President Donald Trump recently announced that the United States intends to resume nuclear testing. It is unclear whether this will involves new weapons systems, but the announcement underscores mounting tensions between the superpowers. The risk of a new nuclear arms race and global proliferation is increasing.
After three decades of nuclear disarmament following the Cold War, during which the American and Russian arsenals shrank by more than 80 percent, nuclear weapons are regaining significance. China expanded its nuclear arsenal from approximately 250 to probably 600 nuclear weapons in the last five years, while Russia has been explicitly and implicitly threatening to use nuclear weapons since its invasion of Ukraine. Even during the Biden presidency, there was broad consensus in Washington that renewed investment in nuclear weapons was needed, as evidenced by the 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on Strategic Posture.
Golden Dome
Countries are investing in new weapon systems for nuclear weapons. Russia recently conducted tests with a nuclear-powered torpedo and a cruise missile, which may have been the direct reason for Trump's announcement of new tests. At the same time, these weapons programmes are a response to American missile defence, of which “Golden Dome” is the most ambitious example since President Ronald Reagan's “Strategic Defence Initiative” in the 1980s. Although the technological innovations are not yet comparable to the arms race at that time, they are following each other at an ever-increasing pace.
At the same time, virtually all arms control agreements from the Cold War have been terminated. The United States does not want to negotiate new agreements without China, Russia opposes talks on an equal footing with China, and China considers itself too small a nuclear power to participate.
The international non-proliferation regime is also under pressure. Since the end of the Cold War, three new nuclear powers have emerged: India, Pakistan and North Korea. The 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty was intended to prevent further proliferation. It is often forgotten, but West Germany, Italy, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and other countries all wanted their own nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s. The United States discouraged these countries by protecting them under the American nuclear umbrella.
Degree of Certainty
But several trends are now converging. First, President Trump's actions are raising questions among allies about the degree of certainty offered by the American security guarantee. As during his first term, this is leading to discussions in Europe and Asia about their own nuclear weapons programmes, such as in South Korea, where politicians are talking about the rapid development of a national nuclear option.
In Europe, this option is not yet being discussed very openly. But Trump is taking NATO to task over defence spending, reducing the American role in Ukraine, and his Secretary of War Pete Hegseth made it clear in February that Europe is no longer a top priority for the United States. This position was confirmed in the most recent national security strategy. Now we are waiting for the new American National Defence Strategy to see what this means in terms of defence.
Secondly, doubts grew in the United States about whether the country has enough nuclear weapons to deter both Russia and China, with North Korea as an additional factor. This so-called “Two Peer Plus” problem reinforces the doubts of allies.
Third, the possession of nuclear weapons once again appears to be an effective trump card over non-nuclear rivals, whether Russia, Israel or North Korea.
Substantial investment is needed in knowledge about nuclear weapons, from deterrence to arms control. Denying this new nuclear world is too dangerous.
Domino Effect
The risk of a domino effect is high. Since the termination of the Iran deal during Trump's first term, Iran has resumed enriching uranium above the level required for nuclear energy. The Saudi crown prince has made clear that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons should Iran cross the nuclear threshold, a position underscored by Riyadh’s defence pact with Pakistan. Turkey will probably not want to be left behind, and so on.
For countries wishing to develop nuclear weapons, the biggest obstacles are not so much technological or normative, but military-strategic. The Israeli attacks on Iran in June this year show how dangerous the path to a nuclear weapon is for an aspiring nuclear weapons state without deterrence. At the same time, the world will not be any calmer if potential nuclear-weapon states are constantly being disarmed preventively.
There is no easy way out. International standards are under pressure and European influence is limited, but there are options. Less dependence on American nuclear weapons requires a strong joint conventional defence; the better Europe can defend itself against Russia, the higher the nuclear threshold. In addition, Europeans must engage in dialogue with nuclear weapon states and potential nuclear weapon states, at least on risk management in conflicts. Finally, substantial investment is needed in knowledge about nuclear weapons, from deterrence to arms control. Denying this new nuclear world is too dangerous.
