How Chinese Military Decisions About Adopting Mission Command Could Affect a Future U.S.-China Conflict
|
by Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Ivana Ke, Amanda Kerrigan, and Edmund J. Burke |
 Members of Chinese PLA Air Force’s Red Falcon aerobatic team attend an airshow in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, Sept. 28, 2021, photo by Aly Song/Reuters | | |
|
|
RAND analysis of Chinese military writings reveals a fundamental tension: the People's Liberation Army (PLA) recognizes that future warfare will place mounting demands on human decisionmakers, a trend driven by emerging technologies and floods of battlefield data. Some PLA researchers argue that mission command—empowering lower levels of command for faster and more resilient decisionmaking—is the solution. But this runs counter to Beijing's strong preference for political control of the military via centralized command. As a result, PLA adoption of mission command will likely be uneven and incomplete. |
|
|
What risks could emerge for the United States?
|
|
|
- Worse crisis behavior: Weaker coordination and control of frontline forces could lead to unpredictable PLA actions.
- Reduced effectiveness of U.S. concepts of operations: More resilient PLA command and greater autonomy could blunt traditional U.S. tactics.
|
|
|
What are the implications for U.S. strategy across different plausible futures?
|
|
|
- Full PLA embrace of mission command. Beijing decides that centralized command is not viable and trusts the PLA's officer corps with greater command authority. The result would be faster, more adaptable, more resilient PLA decisionmaking, perhaps emboldening the Chinese leadership to use force.
Implications for the U.S.: PLA adoption of mission command could reduce the effectiveness of the traditional U.S. tactic of degrading an adversary's command and control. - Stunted PLA embrace of mission command. Senior leaders embrace the concept, but mid-level PLA commanders lack faith in subordinates. Inconsistent experimentation across the PLA increases the use of "skip-echelon command," allowing senior commanders to bypass intermediate units. Some PLA units perform well, but others go beyond their delegated authority, potentially leading to more aggressive, uncoordinated behavior in a crisis because PLA leadership has less control of frontline forces.
Implications for the U.S.: The U.S. may experience more unexpected crises with China; U.S. intelligence collection becomes critical to tracking how different PLA units operate. - Path-dependent continuation of centralized command. Political control remains the priority for the Party and there is institutional PLA resistance to delegation. The result is slower, less flexible, lower-quality PLA decisionmaking, potentially weakening the will to fight.
Implications for the U.S.: The U.S. faces the status quo, or potentially worse, PLA operational performance. |
|
|
What shortcomings remain regardless of the future scenario?
|
|
|
Even if Beijing were to fully embrace mission command, structural vulnerabilities will remain. The PLA's dual-command structure—balancing Party control with military efficiency—creates inherent friction that slows decisions. Add in the PLA's tendency toward micromanagement, and frontline units may gain autonomy in name only. |
|
|
How should the United States proceed?
|
|
|
- Monitor PLA adoption patterns closely and carefully weigh the costs and benefits of opportunities to shape the PLA's approach to future command.
- Design operational concepts that work against all three scenarios.
- Maintain crisis communication channels with Chinese military leadership to hedge against unauthorized PLA actions.
|
|
|