ASEAN Falls Short Again, This Time on U.S. Tariffs

Commentary

May 7, 2025

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim poses for a group photo with delegates during the 2025 ASEAN Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April 10, 2025

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim poses for a group photo with delegates during the 2025 ASEAN Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April 10, 2025

Photo by Hasnoor Hussain/Reuters

This commentary was originally published by Nikkei Asia on May 7, 2025.

Southeast Asia's premier regional bloc—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—is in trouble once again. Malaysia, the current chair, wanted to forge unity and act collectively to respond to American tariffs. Instead, select ASEAN members—including Cambodia and Vietnam—have decided to pursue bilateral trade negotiations to protect their own interests.

In response, Taipei has sought to preemptively offer concessions to Washington. It has pledged to spend at least 3 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. In the private sector, TSMC is investing $100 billion in Arizona to manufacture semiconductor chips. The hope is to placate the Trump administration and convince it not to abandon the island.

But Taiwan should take a deep breath and consider the bright side. Since the Trump administration came into office, both its statements and actions have been consistent with previous administrations, which have been highly supportive of Taiwan. Although Taipei may perceive a heightened threat of abandonment, the facts thus far—specific to Taiwan—do not support such a snap judgment.

Although Taipei may perceive a heightened threat of abandonment, the facts thus far—specific to Taiwan—do not support such a snap judgment.

For one thing, although Trump criticized Taiwan during the campaign, he also suggested he would oppose a Chinese invasion. In October, for example, Trump said about Chinese President Xi Jinping: “If you go into Taiwan, I'm sorry to do this, I'm going to tax you, at 150 percent to 200 percent.” After the election, in early December, Trump in an interview was asked whether he would defend Taiwan if attacked by Beijing, and he said “I'd prefer that they don't do it.”

To be sure, neither of these statements is a ringing endorsement of defending Taiwan, especially when juxtaposed with former President Joe Biden's unambiguous statements—on four separate occasions—that Washington would do so. But, Trump's position also isn't out of line with the traditional U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity. Indeed, when asked whether he would defend Taiwan in the December interview, Trump began with, “I never say.”

Senior Trump administration officials have also noted their intent to continue supporting Taiwan. For example, when asked whether the United States would seek to maintain the status quo, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, “That's the policy of the United States; that remains the policy of the United States.…That's been the policy of President Trump, and that will continue to be his policy.” Last month, at the G7 foreign ministers meeting, Washington agreed to drop the “One China” language that had been meant to appease Beijing and which appeared in past G7 statements. And while visiting Hawaii on his way to Guam, the Philippines, and Japan, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said, “We stand strong in deterrence” in response to Beijing's recent military drills near Taiwan.

Of course, actions count as well. Here, the Trump administration has also demonstrated a resolve to continue supporting Taiwan.

Last month, for example, Washington authorized the first navy ship transit of the Taiwan Strait to bolster deterrence toward China and assure Taiwan. The Trump administration has further sought to speed up arms sales to Taiwan, breaking a years-long backlog that has hampered Taipei's defensive efforts. Despite significant cuts to U.S. assistance worldwide, the Trump administration quietly carved out an exception for Taiwan, reportedly allowing $870 million to reach Taipei. Likewise, the Trump administration quietly updated its State Department fact sheet on Taiwan and in the process deleted the often-used line that notes, “We do not support independence” for Taiwan, greatly angering Beijing.

More broadly, the Trump administration has sought to have a strong relationship with U.S. allies to the north and south of Taiwan. In February Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba visited the White House and by all accounts his meeting with Trump went very well. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is also likely to visit in the coming months to solidify ties. Secretary Hegseth visited both nations late last month and reaffirmed Washington's intent to live up to its security commitments. Additionally, Secretary Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz have met with and expressed their support of these same allies, both of whom would be dramatically impacted by a future U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan.

Despite these encouraging early signs, it will be paramount to continue closely monitoring the Trump administration's position on Taiwan. The first Trump administration, for example, noted in its first-ever Indo-Pacific Strategy report from 2019 that “the United States is pursuing a strong partnership with Taiwan…our partnership is vital given China's continued pressure campaign against Taiwan.” Such direct and clear statements help to clarify the U.S. position, especially if issued by Trump himself.

The focus should be on continued arms sales and security cooperation with Taiwan to help alleviate some of Taipei's worst fears of abandonment.

Earlier this month, as Chinese military threats against the island ramped up to include the launch of a simulated blockade of the island and long-range live-fire drills, the Trump administration reiterated its commitment to Taiwan. The State Department noted, “In the face of China's intimidation tactics and destabilizing behavior, the United States' enduring commitments to our allies and partners, including Taiwan, continue.”

This is a good start. But obviously, U.S. actions are the most salient factor and should be consistent. Trump's 32 percent tariff against Taiwan, for instance, sends the wrong message. Rather, the focus should be on continued arms sales and security cooperation with Taiwan to help alleviate some of Taipei's worst fears of abandonment—even if those fears are not exactly warranted at this moment.

More About This Commentary

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the RAND and an adjunct professor in the practice of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California. He formerly served as an intelligence adviser at the Pentagon.

Topics